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PANEL 8 
HIGH PRESSURE OXYGE& SYSTEM PANEL 
MAY 15, 1970 
CHAIRMAN, RICHARD S. JOHNSTON 
I. ABSTRACT: As a part of the MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team, Panel 8
 
was formed to conduct a survey of the state of the art of breathing
 
oxygen systems design. Typical commercial aviation, military aviation,
 
svbmarine, aircraft carrier, hospital, and altitude chamber oxygen systems,
 
and the Gemini cryogenic system were reviewed in depth by the panel,
 
and technologies, standards, and criteria were examined for similarities
 
and differences. The panel found no great technological differences or
 
unique problem areas, however, there was considerable common concern
 
for better and improved material selection and testing methods, safety
 
criteria, and means of adapting or controlling electrical interfaces.
 
Throughout industry there is a heavy reliance on vendors for proper
 
design, pafety protection, and material selection, The panel concluded
 
that much specific but incomplete information is available in the
 
literature but there is no single established guide or set of criteria
 
for system design. A general design guide for material selection and
 
oxygen system design is required for use throughout the industry.
 
II. 	 TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
Page
 
I. 	Abstract i
 
iiII. Table of Contents 

1
III. Objective 

IV. Approach Taken 	 1
 
V. 	Discussion 2
 
VI. Conclusions/Recommendations 	 6
 
VII. Appendix
 
A. 	Operational Oxygen System Reviews 7
 
1. 	Commercial Aviation
 
J. M. Lea, Dr. R. A. Mahugh, Boeing, H. H. Jamison, MSC
 
2. 	Military Aircraft
 
D. F. Hughes, MSC - S. M. Ramsey, McDonnell-Douglas
 
3. 	Gemini 02 Bottle
 
J. Kennedy, Garrett Corp.
 
4.. 	Submarines
 
Dr. J. E. Johnson, Naval Research Lab
 
5. 	Aircraft Carriers
 
W. T. Kitts, MSQ
 
6. 	Hospital Oxygen Systems
 
Dr. C. K. LaPinta, MSC - Dr. R. A. Mahugh, Boeing
 
7. 	MSC Chamber
 
W. H. Bush, MSC
 
B. 	Criteria and Standards Review 97
 
by John Conlon and J. H. Kimzey
 
107
C. 	Oxygen Specifications Comparison 

D. 	Oxygen system failure experience survey ill
 
ii
 
Ii. OBJECTIVE: The objective of Panel 8, "High Pressure Oxygen Systems
 
Panel." of the MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team was primarily to conduct
 
a comprehensive survey of the state of the art in aircraft and commercial
 
oxygen systems. Although there was very limited time available, the
 
panel also included low pressure gaseous and liquid oxygen systems in
 
its scope to make the survey as complete as possible. Secondary objec­
tives of this survey were considered by the panel to be:
 
a. The identification of differences, if any, in technology between
 
various oxygen systems.
 
b. Identification of new technology which is not in general practice
 
and should be considered for application across the industry.
 
c. The review of various standards and criteria used in the manufacture,
 
service, use, and control of oxygen systems.
 
IV. APPROACH TAKEN: Panel 8 was established on April 17, 1970, by the
 
Apollo Program Manager to conduct the stated survey. Several adminis­
trative meetings were held during the week Of April 20, 1970, to
 
develop the survey approach, the overall panel makeup and worksheet
 
questionaires. To maintain the survey in manageable proportions, the
 
panel selected typical oxygen systems from each of several industries
 
and conducted a detailed review of these systems. The typical systems
 
selected were chosen to be representative of commercial aviation, military
 
aviation, submarine, spacecraft, aircraft carrier, hospital and altitude
 
chamber breathing oxygen systems in use today. During the week of
 
April 27, 1970, representatives of the Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and
 
AiResearch Companies and the Naval Research Laboratory prepared data
 
packages and presented information on their respective oxygen systems
 
to the panel. Presentations and system reviews generally covered the
 
topics listed below:
 
a. Design standards and system features
 
b. System performance requirements
 
c. Component design
 
d. Test philosophy and experience
 
e. Process controls and standards
 
f. Materials control and listings
 
g. Failure experience
 
h. Parts lists and suppliers
 
Information from the presentations and general discussions which followed,
 
and answers to the questionaires were used to make system comparisons.
 
Data submitted by each group is included or referenced in Appendix A.
 
V. DISCUSSION: Because of variations in design, performance require­
ments and operating characteristics, it was not possible to make a direct
 
comparison of the systems. The general characteristics of these systems
 
are summarized in Table 1. Appendix A contains the narrative description,
 
system schematic, and results of the panel questionaire on each of the
 
systems reviewed. The presentation and discussion of the various oxygen
 
systems revealed a number of differences between the design methods and
 
needs of the different commercial and governmental groups. However, a
 
common concern for safety was very much in evidence. Discussions of
 
safety considerations indicated that one major concern of each group
 
was the control of fuel (combustible material) and ignitation sources.
 
Fuel was considered to be both metallic and nonmetallic system materials
 
and contaminants in the presence of the oxidizer. Ignition sources were
 
considered to be any phenomenon which could cause a material to reach its
 
ignition temperature.
 
In design considerations, the hospital, altitude chamber and shipboard 
systems are not greatly restricted by size, weight, and volume as are 
tie aircraft and spacecraft systems. Therefore, for these ground 
based systems, design margins for strength and fire resistance are greater. 
All systems-employed relief valves or burst disks to protect lines against
 
overpressure. Only the hospital and altitude chamber systems had all
 
relief lines vented out of the buildings or use area. Static electricity
 
was considered as a potential danger and all systems require4 electrical
 
grounding during operation and servicing. Contamination control in
 
regard to cleaning, oxygen procurement specification, and particulate
 
filtering was common to all systems but varied greatly in requirement,
 
application, and certification. All systems are cleaned at the time of
 
installation or manufacture except for the hospital which utilized pre­
cleaned pipe. All systems except the hospital utilize particulate
 
filtering at the service point as a minimum.
 
The interfacing of electrical systems to the oxygen system was one of
 
the major ignition sources considered by the various groups. It was found
 
that the military aircraft, the Gemini supercritical tanks, and the MSC
 
altitude chamber had requirements for electrical equipment within the
 
oxygen environments. The military aircraft lox converter contains a
 
capacitance probe in the lox tank as does the Gemini cryogenic tank:
 
The altitude chamber which is similar in some test configurations to
 
spacecraft crew compartments, requires many electrical system interfaces,
 
Wire sizing to load, individual wire fusing, close control of wire
 
insulation and connector potting, and isolating of circuits and power
 
consuming devices by hermetic sealing or nitrogen blanketing are a few
 
of the techniques employed in chamber design. All except the Navy systems
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Table I-
TABLE OF OXYGEN SYSTEMS 
SYSTEM TE OPR- OPERATING ATING !TEMP. 
PRESSURE 
esig 
PIPING AND OTHER 
METALLICTUBINGSytmRd 
MATERIAL 
MAVL USED 
NONMETALLIC 
MATERIAL 
USED 
MATL 
AVOIDED 
ELECT 
(Electrical 
yst 
°?rvn.' 
ENVIRON ACCEPT. PERIODIC 
QUJAL TESTING MAINT 
TEST 
PERI-
ODIC 
CLEAN. 
SINGLE POINT FAIL. 
Redundant Redundant 
Systems Coponets 
MSC CHAMBER; 
Source 
Dis r buton 
Use 
COx 
COX 
CO 
2200 
100 
3,5-20 Pan 
Ambient 
Ambient 
0 to 100 
s s, 
s.., Cu 
Al, s.s, Cu 
Bronze & Brass 
Bronze &Brass 
SAME 
Teflon, Viton Perrous 
Metals 
Kld-F, neoprene Hydro-
carbons 
Beta, PMI Webbing SAME 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NQ 
NO 
NO 
MILITARY AIRCRAFT,Smerc, LOX i -320 S.$ S.S.' Teflon, carbon, YES YES YES YES YES YES NO 
Distnbution 
Use 
HOSPITAL SYSTEM 
Source 
Distrbuton 
Use 
COX 
COX 
LOX 
COX 
COX 
72 
3.5-15 psa 
70 
60 
Ambient 
-297/90 
Ambient 
-290 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Al 
Al 
s.s,, Al 
Cu 
Cu, Brass 
Cu-Ni 
$s. 
A 
Sear 
Cu, Bronze, 
silver solder, 
Aluminum 
Kel-E. 
Vita , 
Silicone 
Rubber 
Teflon, 
Neoprene, 
Cellulose 
Acetate 
Steel, Nen­
prem 
N/A 
Ferrous 
Metals 
Hydro-
carbons 
NO 
YES, Crew 
Microphone 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
N/A 
N/A 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO (2) 
NO (2) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
tI 
GEMINI 02 I1OTTLE, 
Source (I) 
SiI-YE 
Critie 
Cox 
900 -290 S.1. 718 Ieonrel 
Press. Vessel 
Silicone Rubber N/A YES YES YES YES NO YES NO 
SUBMARINES. 
Source 
Distribution 
Use 
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 
Source 
Distribution (3) 
Distnbution (6) 
COx 
CoX 
GOX 
LOX 
LOX 
COX 
3000 
100 
Ambient 
85 
85 
35 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
approx. 
-300 
SAME 
Ambient 
Monel 
Monet 
MoneO 
s.c 
as 
Is. 
ss, pressur
vessel, Cu 
Bronze 
Brass 
Cu, Monde 
Bronze 
Teflon, INel-FFluorocarbons 
Tflon, Nylon 
Teflon, Kel-F 
PerrouiMetals 
Hydro-
carbons 
Rubber
Pla-stics 
Ferrous 
Metals 
Hydro-
carbons 
Rubber 
Plastics 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
COMMERCIAL AVN, 
Source 
Distribution 
Use 
COx 
COX 
COX 
1850 
150-600 
0 to IS0 
Ambient 
Ambient 
Ambient 
as 
$s. 
At 
Bronze, Al, 
Brass Yellow 
Chromaun, 
Co, Carbon 
Steel 
Kl-FP, Teflon, 
Nylon, Silecone 
Rubber, Vinyl 
Plastic, SIlcone 
Rubber 
Tiaaium 
Magnesum
Rubber 
Hydro­
carbons 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES (4) 
YES (4) 
N/A 
YES (4) 
YES (4) 
N/A 
NO (2) 
NO (2) 
NO 
NO 
YES (7) 
YES 
__ __ __ _ I_ I_ I _ _ I __ I _ _ I__ I _ __ I I I_ 
(I)(2) (3) 
Other sections o Gemini oxygen system
Portable bottles available 
Carrier use is by military aircraft, 
not considered (4) Penodm nmaintenance and cleaning portormcd by 
(5) N/A Data aot available (6) LOX converted to high presure gas 
(7) Redundancy provided in system actuation only 
aircraft user. 
contain transducers, remote alarms, solenoid valves, and other
 
electrically operated devces which are not directly in the oxygen
 
environment. In the event of a failure in these components, the
 
internal electrical section of the device could be overheated or
 
exposed to oxygen. The commercial aviation system reviewed requires
 
that all interfacing electrical devices, as mentioned above,
 
be tested to simulate an overvoltage failure. It is required that
 
this type of failure will not result in a loss of integrity of the
 
oxygen system. The panel found no formal government or industry
 
standard which controls electrical interfaces. (see Appendix B)
 
In all systems reviewed it is required that vendors perform acceptance
 
testing of the component prior to shipment to the major contractor or
 
use facility. Some organizations perform component bench tests prior to
 
system installation. However, all organizations perform installed systems
 
tests for leakage and function although the extent of the functional
 
test varied greatly. Environmental qualification tests are unique to
 
the military and aerospace industry. Periodic maintenance and cleaning
 
are generally not the rule and, primarily, maintenance is performed
 
only'as required for failure'correction. All systems require batch
 
sampling of the supply oxygen prior to system filling. Only the altitude
 
chamber requires periodic sampling from the use ports. The Navy dis­
cussed a problem which it has experienced and was related to sampling.
 
It was found, in some instances, that oxygen sampled from the aircraft
 
lox converter did not meet specifications although the carrier supply
 
was within specification. It was determined that some contaminants
 
would remain in the liquid oxygen when the system is not in use and
 
with repeated partial refilling of the converter, would tend to increase
 
in concentration within the converter. The Navy now requires that each
 
converter be cleaned every 30 days.
 
The subject of failures was discussed briefly. Although many failures
 
are known,few were of a catastrophic nature and failures were generally
 
related to improper servicing procedures and handling methods. The method
 
for analyzing for failures vary greatly. Critical design reviews, failure
 
modes and effects analysis and experience record for similar systems are
 
used to assure reliability and safety.
 
The subject of nonmetallic material use was discussed, and it was
 
generally accepted that this area needs standardization of testing and
 
selection criteria. (See Appendix D). The system participants indicated
 
that both the government and prime contractors purchase component parts
 
from vendors with experience in manufacturing oxygen system components
 
and great reliance is made on these vendors to choose- "oxygen compatible" 
nonmetallic materials. Also, no adequate vendor, contractor, or govern­
ment list of acceptable materials was presented or known. Much of the
 
time, material selection was based upon experience or limited test data.
 
The use of nonmetallics is often compensated by the selection of metals
 
which will contain fire should it occur in the nonmetallic material as
 
a result of heating from without or within the system. For some new
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designs nonmetallic material selected for commercial aircraft use
 
cannot have a burning temperature which could result in the ignition
 
of the surrounding metal. It should be noted that one commercial 
airplane manufacturer has undertaken a development program to eliminate 
all nonmetallic material interfacing the flow stream of the high
 
pressure portion of the oxygen system. Also tests are being developed 
to demonstrate that a reasonable amount of contaminant can be ignited 
within components without burning through their housing. 
No unique design elements or features were found, however, a device 
used on some commercial aircraft should be mentioned. This device is 
called a thermal compensator and it is used before each valve, having a 
nonmetallic seat which could be subjected to rapid pressurization. 
Rapid repressurization can cause temperatures to increase by compres­
sion to the ignition temperature of contaminants which could then 
lead to burning of the nonmetallic materials. The thermal compensator 
absorbs and conducts heat from the gas to- the surrounding plumbing, 
thereby preventing the high gas temperature. The device is simply a 
chromium copper alloy ire brush configuration, approximately 5 inches 
long, which is placed inside the plumbing at the dead end. This device
 
may be useful to provide additional safety margins for rapid pressuriza­
tion heating.
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS:
 
1. No great technology differences exist among the fields reviewed.
 
2. Breathing oxygen systems utilized today have been quite
 
successful in meeting their intent. The majority of the relatively
 
few failures which have occurred have been traced to poor handling
 
practices.
 
3. The success of today's designs has been the result of designing 
by experience, largely without thorough scientific understanding. 
4. Improvement in and standardization of specifications and
 
guidelines are needed in the following areas:
 
a. System design requirements as a function of pressure, and
 
use.
 
b, Materials requirements and a suitable list of materials
 
for specific applications.
 
c. Materials test methods which will verify suitability of
 
materials for the given applications.
 
d. Accurate testing methods for determination of a given
 
systems contamination level.
 
e. Allowable contamination levels and materials including
 
particle sizes for the various system pressure levels.
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A. Operational Oxygen System Reviews
 
PAGE 
I. Commercial Aviation
 
by J. Lea, and Dr. R. A. Mahugh, Boeing,
 
and H, H. Jamison, MSC
 
(a) Description
 
(b) Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) Sketch
 
(d) Bibliography
 
1q'BBA 
Jet Transport Oxygen Systems
 
With the advent of commercial jet transports in the late 1950's, the 
maximum cruising altitudes of commercial airplanes was increased from 
25,000 to 42,000 feet. The crew oxygen systems were revised to pro­
vide diluter demand pressure breathing and a new automatically presented 
continuous flow oxygen system was developed for the passengers. These
 
systems were designed to handle the emergency descent following a pos-.
 
sible rapid decompression at 42,000 feet. The oxygen flow rates in
 
both systems are controlled by aneroids which sense the cabin altitude.
 
Separate crew and passenger systems are provided in commercial jet
 
transports and these systems are backed up by portable oxygen cylinders. 
The oxygen supply for all commercial jet transports is provided by 
1850 psi ambient temperature gas storage cylinders. A schematic diagram 
of the crew and passenger oxygen systems for a typical current commercial 
jet transport is attached. These systems are generally quite similar on 
all jet transports. 
Some aircraft now in development will have passenger oxygen systems supplied
 
by chlorate candles. In these systems, sepatate candles are provided for
 
each group of seats in a seat row. Candles will be ignited mechanically
 
when the mask is removed from stowage. The crew oxygen systems will be
 
gaseous as on other jets.
 
In the all-gaseous systems, the pressure is provided by pressure reducers
 
located near the storage cylinders and is further reduced and modulated
 
by the flow control units, additional in-line reducing valves and/or
 
diluter demand regulators as shown on the schematic and reference drawings.
 
The plumbing in the high pressure systems is stainless steel and valve
 
housings are generally of brass or bronze. Valve seat materials are
 
generally of metal or Kel-F. New valves are being developed which will
 
allow more general use of metal seats in high pressure valves. Medium 
pressure tubing is also generally of stainless steel and -valve seats 
are generally Kel-F. Low pressure tubing which is normally pressurized 
is usually stainless steel but distribution tubing in the portions of 
the system normally unpressurized is generally of aluminum. The res­
ervoir bags and hoses on the passenger masks are of vinyl plastic.
 
Face masks are of silicone rubber.
 
Boeing recommends replenishment of the crew and passenger oxygen systems
 
by cylinder replacement. However, facilities for external charging are
 
available which control the filling rate and automatically turn off the 
charging supply when the system has reached the design charging pressure.
 
Cylinder valves are slow-opening to limit pressurization heating. On
 
Boeing airplanes a heat sink device is added to reduce further the pos­
sibility of heating at high pressure dead-ends where there are nonmetal
 
materials. The heat sink is called a thermal compensator. It is built
 
in the form of a wire brush made of chromium copper alloy. It limits
 
13 PRE0ED7NG PAGE BLANK NOT PffMD 
the heat of compression by providing a heat sink within the hot gas
 
and shortening the distance that the heat must travel within the gas.
 
A rupture disc is provided in each cylinder valve which is connected
 
to an 6verboard discharge system which will discharge the oxygen over­
board"'in event of over-pressurizing of the cylinders or fire in the
 
vicinity of the cylinders.
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PAGE I OF 4 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 DATE 
MILITARY AVIATION 0 
SUBMARINE 0 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 0 
MSC CHAMBER 0 PRESENTER ,. -, Tea 
HOSPITAL 0 R. A. Mahugh 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox Lo Pressure Gox X Hi Pressure Gox X 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of 36ints/Fittings - MS flareless and pipe threads
 
High pressure - 18-8 stainless low press. alunminum
 
Operating Life & Level - Operating life varies with components. Some component specifications 
indicate 60,000 hour goal.
 
Shelf Life/Age Life - Cylinders controlled by ICC. No specified limit on most components. 
° 
Operating Environment & Limitations - -65 to +160 F.
 
-40 to +i6o F.
 
-100WO to 45,100' altitude
 
Special or Unique Component Designs - Several components combined into single housings.
 
Single Point Failures - Service experience shows high reliability
 
Backup provided by portable cylinders
 
-Static Electric Charge Precautions - Bonding spec., BAC 5117, "Electrical Bonding and Grounding" 
Electrical Interfaces - No wiring exposed to oxygen
 
Special over-voltage tests for electrical components
 
Ignition Source Control - 1. Slow-opening valves. 2. Cleanliness control per BAC-5402 and 
3. Fire resistant materials. 4. Heat sinks (thermal compensators) provided at
BPS-O-100. 

some dead-end locations to control compression heating.
 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special
 
Handling Requirements/inspections.
 
Manufacture BPS-O-100 "General Engineering Requirements for Breathing Oxygen System Components 
(3 milligrams hydrocarbon/sq.t.). (BAC-5402 "Oxygen Systems" (Mfg. & Instl Control)(5 milligram
 
(BAC-5408 "Vapor Degreasing"(Cleaning Methods) (of hydro­
(carbon/§q.fService, Maintenance & Repair: 

Boeing Document D6-22676, 'Airplane Servicing, Gaseous Oxygen."
 
Boeing Maintenance Manuals, Sections 35-11 and 35-21.
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Ql*i-n-nni1 
PAGE 2 OF 4 
GOX Commercial Lea/Mahugh 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL.. ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - qontinued 
-i.
 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
.Design groups conduct critical design reviews; meet requirements for. certification 
FMEA,etc. - per FAR 25. (Presented in certification docune nts for airplane type.) 
Configuration Control(s) - NIL Specs; SAE recommendations, vendor proposals, and Boeing Engineering 
Approval. 
Certification/R'ecertifications -Airplane type certification and model certification per FAR part 25. 
Airplane certification by airlines per FAR part 121.
 
Testing/Retesting --Functional test document and maintenance manuals. 
Material Control (Procedure) - Boeing operating procedure 6-1000-041 "Aircraft Oxygen Systems and 
Su ortipg Equipment", Boeing process spec. No. BAC-5402 "Oxygen Systems", BAC-5408 "Vapor De­
gise 1 9nfrol - Individual component specifications, Boeing Parts Specification, BPSO-100 "General 
Engineering Requirements For Breathing Oxygen System Components." 
TESTING
 
Philosophy. Environmental qualification tests by vendors, with oxygen, functional test of cbmpo­
nents and systems in factory with N2 and system acceptance tests with oxygen are required. 
Experience: Development and production testing experience has been routine. 
Operational Certification: Only problems during certification were mask-drop reliability,/ 
Test Failures: No system failures during development, production, or certification testing9 
SAFETY FEATURES 
Relief Valves - On most medium and low pressure systems.
 
Burst Discs - On high pressure systems.
 
Redundancies - In system initiation and flow control units in passenger systems only.
 
Over Design - Aircraft quality for reliability.
 
Electra Static Charge Control - Boeing process. spec. BAC-5117 "Electrical Bonding and Grounding"
 
Other -1. Recommend replenishment by cylinder exchange. 2. Use slow-opening cylinder valves.
 
3. Filler valve to control flow rates and maximum pressure. 4. Thermal compensators (heat
 
sinks) at some dead-ends susceptible to compression heating.
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PAGE 3 OF 4 
COX Commercial Lea/Mahugh 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL.. ETC. PRESENTER 
-OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: 
Some fires have occurred during system servicing and testing on the ground on earlier models.
 
No system failures have occurred in flight. Some temporary mask "hangups," inadvertent pas­
senger system actuations and valve seat disappearances have been reported.
 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: 
Scott Aviation Corporation, Lancaster, New York (greater than 80 of equipment)
 
Puritan Equipment Corporation, Lenexa, Kansas
 
ARC of California, Los Angeles, California
 
Carleton Control Corporation, East Aurora, New York
 
Sierra Engineering, Sierra Madre, California
 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials SEE ATTACHED SHEET 
Pressure Range -
Temperature Range -
Design Considerations/Application Limitations -
Screening Tests -
Special Procedures -
Ignition Source Controls -
Failure Experience ­
17
 
PAGE 4 OF 4
 
COX" Gommercial Lel/Mabugh
 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM.. MIL.. ETC. PRESENTER 
6PERATI6NAL SYSTEM REVIEW VORK SHEET - Conclud6d 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
SEE ATTACHED SHEET
 
Class One, A, etc.-
I. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3.. Application 'Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls ­
-Clas Two; "B;-etc.-
I. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Three, C, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS 
Titanium, magnesium, rubber, hydrocarbons
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MATERIALS FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT OXYGEN SYSTEMS
 
Material Use 
Press. 
Range 
PSIG 
Temp. 
Range 
OF. 
Design 
Consid. 
Applic. 
Limits 
;Screen-
'ing 
Tests 
Spec. 
Proc. 
Ignition 
Source 
Control 
Failure 
Experi­
ence 
Metals 
18-8 Stainless steel GOX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
Local ig- Plumbing, 
nition valve 
sources & h6usings 
combustion and parts 
character-
Parts & 
system 
qualifi-
cation 
tests 
Limit of Slow open-
5 mg. hy- ing valves, 
drocarbon Electrical 
per sq.ft.bonding & 
BAC-5402 cleanliness 
*Has re­
sisted ex­
ternal fires 
but has been 
consumed dur­
istics control ing internal 
system fires 
Aluminum alloy COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
do. Some fit-
tings & 
valve 
housings. 
Tubing in 
do. do. do. *Has ruptured 
in external 
fires & has 
been consumed 
during internal 
esure 
low pres-
sys­
tems only 
fires 
Brass - yellow GOX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
Local 
ignition 
sources 
Valve 
housings 
& valve 
do. do. do. *Has good re­
sistance to 
external & 
parts internal fires 
Monel COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
do. Plumbing 
housings 
& valve 
parts 
do. do. do New applica­
tion, no ex­
gerience 
Bronze GOX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
do. Valve 
housings, 
valve 
do. do. do. *Has good re­
sistance to 
external & 
parts -& internal fires 
filter el­
ements 
*No failures directly attributed to use of this material in oxygen systems
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MATERIALS FOR COMMIERCIAL TRAN4SPORT OXYGEN SYSTEMSI 
Material Use 
Pres. 
Range 
PSIG 
Temp -
Range 
OF. 
Design 
Consid. 
Applic. 
Limits 
Screen-
ing 
Tests 
Spec. 
Proc. 
Ignition 
Source 
Control 
Failure 
Experi­
ence 
Metals (cont.) 
Carbon steel COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
Local ig-
nition 
sources 
General- Parts & 
ly 'limited system 
to storage quali-
cylinders fication 
tests 
'Limit of Slow pres-
3 mg. hy- surization 
drocarbon rate, elec-
per sq.ft'trical bond-
BPS-0-100|ing & clean-
liness 
control 
*Has good 
resistance 
to external 
fires. No 
experience 
with interior 
fires 
Nonmetal 
Kel-F 81 COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
Local ig- VAIve 
nition seats 
sources, and 
quantity seals 
& location 
of materi-
al 
Parts 
quali-
fication 
tests 
Limit of Slow open-
3 mg. hy- ing valves 
drocarbon & dead-end 
per sq ft:heat sinks 
BPS-0-100HBPS-0-lO0 
& BAC-5402 
*Burned when 
ignited by 
extetnal fire. 
Spontaneous 
"tdisappearancel 
of valve seats 
has been re­
ported 
Teflon COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
do. Valve 
seats & 
s&als & 
low pres­
do. do. do. *Burned when 
ignited by 
external fire. 
sure 
hoses 
Silicone rubber COX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
do. Siatic 
seals, 
low pres­
sure dia­
do. do. do * do. 
phragms & 
face masks 
*1No failures directly attributed to use of this material in oxygen systems.
 
Material 'Use 
Pres. 
Range, 
PSIG 
MATERIALS FOR COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT OXYGEN SYSTEMS 
Temp.':' I I ' Screen- I 
Range Design Applic. ing Spec. 
OF. Consid. Limits 'Tests Proc. 
Ignition 
ISource 
Control 
'Failure 
Experi­
ence 
Nonmetal (cont.) 
Thread sealant 
MIL-T-5542 
GOX 0-3000 -65 to 
+160 
Local ig-
nition 
sources, 
quantity 
& loca-
tion of 
material 
Apply to 
male 
threads 
only, per 
BAG 5402 
Parts 
qualifi-
cation 
tests 
Apply 
sparing-
ly to 
first 
three 
male 
threads 
only per 
BAC-5402 
Slow open-
ing valves 
& dead end 
heat sinks 
BPS-0-100 
BAC-5402 
* "Disappearedt' 
when heated by 
external fire. 
Vinyl plastic GOX 0-150 -40 to 
+160 
Local ig-
nition 
sources 
& design 
require-
ments 
Reser-
voir bags 
and tub-
ing--low 
pressure 
system 
only 
do. Limit of Prevent 
3 mg. hy- smoking 
drocarbon during 
per sq.ft use 
BPS-0-100 
*No failure 
experience. 
*No failures directly attributed to use of this material in oxygen ystems.
 
NOTE: See Boeing Drawing 65B50300 for basic design 
Dual (without external charging system) for furtheroweurae lindtr i FulPanelPressure nder ]n details on low pressure system, and for list of 
Presure 
I materials and components. 
Warning Iiat pass l 
Attendants anes 
at Doors I &4. I / [ Stabilized Pressure 18001850 psi or Highest Cylinder Pressure 
F-.-'/7 , 
Mda Press. Cage. 
Fc T 
__ ___ 
,Paah nge Oxbeglhse Low FlowCrew02 To ipght DeckLFlwPes.800/ 8110 psi-Hi Flow Press 60(1 680ps 
Voltage 
Unit Crew Ox~ygen Cylinders Passenger Oxygen Cylinds 
Stabilized Press, due to leakage 1800/1850 psi 
-~Low Flow Prssr 800/830 psiHigh Flow Pressure 600/680 psi 
11B50010 
-4 
5B0010 
-5 
60B50010 
-6 
Pneumatic Flow Control Unit 
_____________________
With Surge 
Eleetro-PneuaticFlowContol6 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 
Unit W/Surge &Press. Switch - 747 CREW AND PASSENGER OXYGEN SYSTEMS WITH 
Electro-Pneumatic Flow Control EXTERNAL CHARGING FACILITIES 
Unit Without Surge I 
Flow Control Units 
Bibliography - Commercial Aircraft Oxygen System (Boeing)
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Rapid Filling of a Cylinder With a Compressible Fluid 
A. E. Schmidlin (12/1/66) 
AIAA 67-965 Oxygen Safety - Submarine to Aircraft, J. Aircraft, Vol. 5, 
No. 6 
Controlling Cleanliness In the Saturn V First Stage, 
Contamination Control, March 1968 
CGAAG-4.1" Equipment Cleaned for Oxygen Service, March 1959 
AMRL-TDR-64- Compatibility of Materials with 7,500 psi Oxygen, Nihart 
76 and Smith, (Oct. 1964) 
Drawihgs 
Scott Aviation Dwg. 801335 Coupling Assembly 
Scott Aviation Dwg. 801333 Body and Gage Assembly 
Carleton Controls Corp. Dwg. Regulator, Oxygen, Pressure Reducing 
2278501 
Carleton Controls Corp. Dwg. Valve Assembly, Oxygen Filler 
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Douglas Process Standards
 
DPS 1.14 Closure of Openings 
DPS 1.22 Anti-Seize Lubricants for Mating Parts 
DPS 3.22 Identification of Fluid Lines - Aircraft 
DPS 3.27 Marking Methods and Materials 
DPS 3.310 Preparing Military Parts for Shipment 
DPS 3.572 Aircraft and Missile Hose and Hose Assembly 
DPS 3.80 Fluid Piping and Fittings 
DPS 3.80-5 Fluid Piping and Fittings - Fabrication 
DPS 3.80-6 Fluid Piping and Fittings - Couplings 
DPS 3.'80-7 Fluid Piping and Fittings - Installation 
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DPS 4.901 Breathing Oxygen Specs 
DPS 4.901-1 Low Pressure Oxygen System (400 psi) 
DPS 4,901-2 High Pressure Oxygen System (1800 psi) 
DPS 4.901-3 Installed Oxygen Equipment 
DPS 4.901-4 Oxygen Units 
DPS 4.901-5 Use of Halogen Detector 
DPS 4.901-6 Liquid Oxygen Breathing System 
DPS 4.902 Bottled Gases 
DPS 4.903 Storing and Handling Liquid Breathing Oxygen 
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DPS 9.341 Vapor Degreasing 
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General Description of System:
 
The liquid oxygen system consists of the liquid oxygen converter and
 
its associated components, a warmup plate, diluter demand oxygen regulators,
 
supply and vent lines, supply line filters, and supply line relief valve.
 
The basic unit of the system is the liquid oxygen converter. The liquid
 
oxygen converter is a quick-removable unit that contains space for liquid
 
oxygen storage, a combination fill, buildup and vent valve, a pressure con­
trol valve, a capacitance probe, a relief valve, and a buildup coil. During
 
normal operation, the conversion of liquid to gaseous oxygen is automatically
 
accomplished within the converter and its components. The rate at which
 
liquid oxygen is converted to gaseous oxygen depends upon the demands placed
 
upon the system by the flight crew. A capacitance type quantity indicating 
system is utilized to inform the crew of the amount of oxygen contained in 
the converter. A warning light located on the vertical panel forward of
 
the pilot's right console warns of low oxygen supply. Gaseous oxygen gen­
erated by the converter is extremely cold and must be warmed before the oxy­
gen, can be breathed by the crew members. The oxygen, received from the 
converter, is warmed by a warmup plate. Normal servicing is accomplished
 
with the converter in the aircraft; however, the quick removable feature
 
of the converter enables the unit to be filled in a remote area away from
 
the aircraft, which reduces the hazards involved with servicing the con­
verter while installed in the aircraft. Turnaround time is also reduced
 
by replacing any empty converter with a full converter.
 
Normal oxygen is diverted from the supply line through the diluter
 
demand oxygen regulators to the right donsoles and to the crew members' 
oxygen masks. See Figures 1 and 2. A filter in each diluter demand oxygen 
regulator removes contaminants acquired through improper handling or storage 
of liquid oxygen.
 
Liquid oxygen quantity is indicated on the quantity indicators, which 
are located in the forward and aft cockpits. These indicators enable the 
pilot and radar pilot to determine the amount of liquid oxygen (in liters)
 
that remains in the oxygen convefter at all times during flight. The in­
dicators are automatically operated by the gaging system which consists of
 
a capacitance probe and an amplifying unit. The capacitance probe, located
 
within the converter, serves as the sensing element for the system and
 
supplies electrical variations to the amplifying unit. A preflight test
 
of the indicators is accomplished with the oxygen quantity test switch.
 
This push type switch is located on the pilot's left utility panel. When
 
the switch is depressed, thd pointer of the quantity indicator rotates 
toward zero. As the pointer passes the 1-liter mark, the oxygen low warning
 
light illuminates and the indicator pointer continues to rotate to zero.
 
When the pointer reaches zero, and the test switch is released, the pointer 
rotates to the same reading that was registered-on the indicator before
 
the test switch was depressed, and the warning light extinguishes. 
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BA"ItMtOC(FL 
AIR FORCE LIQUID OXYGEN SYSTEM
 
(Without Pressure Suit Capability)
 
THEORY OF OPERATION
 
General System Operation. The liquid oxygen system is automatically
 
operated by controlling the rate ofevaporation of liquid oxygen with pres­
sure operating valves. Evaporation of liquid oxygen is accomplished by
 
adding heat to the liquid which causes it to expand and, therefore, raise
 
its pressure. A buildup coil is incorporated in the system which provides
 
the necessary heat transfer to the liquid.
 
The pressure closing valve controls the rate of liquid evaporation
 
during flow. A relief valve is provided to relieve excess pressure caused
 
from repeated cycling or low demand on the system. General system opera­
tion involves several phases or modes of operation which are explained
 
below.
 
Filling. See Figure 1. Filling the system is generally required
 
prior to each flight to ensure that an adequate supply of liquid oxygen
 
is available in the system at all times. During the filling operation,
 
liquid oxygen is transferred to converter from the servicing trailer
 
through the transfer hose. The hose contains a nozzle that attaches to
 
the fill, buildup and vent valve of the system. The hose nozzle when
 
attached to the fill, buildup and vent valve, actuates a plunger within
 
the valve which places the valve in the vent position. The valve, when
 
in the vent position, provides an opening from the top of the converter
 
to the atmosphere which is utilized to vent gaseous oxygen during filling
 
and liquid after the converter is full. During liquid transfer, liquid
 
oxygen flows into the converter through a passage located in the bottom
 
of the converter. This arrangement allows gaseous oxygen-to vent through
 
the converter top as it is being displaced by liquid flow in the bottom.
 
When the converter is completely full, liquid flows overboard through the
 
vent line. Removal of the transfer hose nozzle from the fill, buildup
 
and vent valve automatically places the system in the buildup phase.
 
Buildup. See Figure 1.- The buildup phase of operation provides
 
a rapid pressure buildup to normal operating pressure. During this
 
phase, liquid oxygen from the liquid container fills the buildup coil by
 
gravitational feed. Liquid in the coil absorbs heat from the coil and
 
vaporizes which causes a pressure buildup. Gaseous oxygen formed in the
 
coil then circulEtes.s through the pressure closing valve and back to the
 
top of the converter which enables more liquid to flow into the buildup
 
coil. This circulation and pressure buildup corlinues until approximately
 
72 psi is reached, at which time the pressure closing valve closes, pre­
venting rapid liquid evaporation and consequent fast boil-off (venting).
 
Normal Operation. Normal operation begins during the buildup phase
 
and continues until all liquid oxygen has evaporated from the system.
 
When system pressure is low and a demand by the aircrewman creates a
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pressure drop in the supply line, liquid oxygen is drawn from the bottom
 
of the converter. As the liquid travels through the supply line and •
 
warmup coil, vaporization occurs which provides gaseous oxygen for breath­
ing and also aids pressure buildup in the system. As system pressure inu
 
creases to approximately 72 psi, the pressure closing valve closes which
 
prevents rapid pressure buildup to continue. As the pressure is lowered
 
by crew consumption, the pressure closing valve opens allowing the pressure
 
to again buildup. When oxygen is not'being used, the pressure continues
 
to increase by normal evaporation until it reaches a value equal to the relief
 
valve setting. At this point the relief valve opens allowing excess pres­
sure to escape from the system.
 
SYSTEM PRESSURE SUPPLY
 
Standard Flight Gear Normal Operation. See Figure 2. Normal
 
system operation with standard flight gear is primarily controlled by
 
the diluter demand oxygen regulator ON/OFF valves. With the valve lever
 
placed on the ON position, gaseous oxygen from the liquid oxygen conver­
ter passes through the diluter demand regulator inlet filter and is then
 
automatically mixed with cabin air at a ratio dependent upon cabin altitude.
 
This mixture is then delivered upon demand through the system lines and
 
hoses to thecrewmemberls oxygen mask.
 
Standard Fligh Gear Emergency Operation. The emergency oxygen cylinder
 
is attached inside the aft left corner of the seat bucket. See Figure 2.
 
Upon actuation by the emergency oxygen manual release control (10), the oxy­
gen flows from the cylinder to the standard flight gear adapter assembly.

During seat ejection, emergency oxygen is automatically actuated by the
 
trip lever (11) being rotated by hitting the emergency oxygen automatic
 
release striker plate (7).
 
Diluter Demand Oxygen Regulator Emergency Function. In situations
 
where oxygen supply is available from the liquid oxygen converter, the
 
diluter demand oxygen regulator will furnish an emergency nondiluted
 
supply of oxygen to the crewmember's mask. By placing the EMERGENCY-

NORMAL-TEST MASK selector to the EMERGENCY position, 100% oxygen coupled
 
with an increase in pressure is automatically supplied to the crewmember
 
(100% oxygen will be furnished regardless of the position of the 100%
 
NORMAL selector). This emergency function of the regulator can be utilized
 
in situations such as loss of a canopy in flight, smoke in the cockpit, or
 
suspected insufficient normal oxygen supply.
 
31
 
PAGE 1 OF 4
 
DATE 4/28/70COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 
MILITARY AVIATION 12 
SUBMARINE 0 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 0 C 
PRESENTER C. M. RamseyMSC CHAMBER - 0 

HOSPITAL C
 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox X Lo Pressure Gox X Hi Pressure Gox 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of Joints/Fittines - Metal-to-metal, 5052-0 Al., Al. Tubing, AN fittings & B-nuts 
Operating Life & Level - System operating, life varies with components. 
with as required replacement of failed components.
 
Shelf Life/Age Life - Elastomer components, except silicones, not more than 12 months. 
Operating Environment & Limitations -Alt. - Sea level to 70,000 ft. with pressure suit 
45,000 ft. with standard gear
 
Temp. --65o F to +1600 F Vibration & shock per MIL-E-5272
 
Special or Unique Component Designs - and MDC Rpt. 8738 
Standard per NIL-C-19803D and MIL-I-19376B (AER)
 
Single Point Failures - No formal review made, emergency system provides redundancy except 
for oxygen mask.
 
Static Electric Charge Precautions - Bonding per MIL-B05087 Jumpers 
Electrical Interfaces - Capacitance 02 quantity gaging system 
Material selection control by applicable specifications and drawings. 
Ignition Source Control - Hardware and fluid systems contamination control by quality assurance: 
MDC-PS 12020 
12300 
20021
 
17009
 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination LevelsjSpecial
 
Handling Requirements/Inspections.
 
Manufacture: See attached documentation sheet 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: AFTO IF-4C-2-7, part 2 
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Liouid/Gageouk Oxygen Military C. M. Ramsey - MDC 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - Equivalent analysis achieved by contractor and customer system design reviews to 
insure safety and reliability.
 
Configuration Control(s) - Part No. changes for all hardware change 
Certification/Recertifications - Qualification testing per design requirements and environmental 
requirements per MIL-E-5272 and MDC Rpt. 8738
 
Testing/Retesting - Retesting or certification by analysis
 
Material Control (Procedure) - Nonmetallic materials usage reviewed by materials dept.
 
Parts Control - See configuration control(s)
 
TESTING
 
Philosophy: To comply with applicable military and company specifications and demonstrate
 
acceptability of ,system for mission performance.
 
Experience: Approximately 3,800 F-4 series aircraft. 
Operational Certification: 
Test Failures: Failure to conform to MIL-C-19803D, para. 4.8.9, Evaporation Loss Tests, due to 
leakage through buildup and vent valve or loss of vacuum insulation due to container leakage.
 
SAFETY FEATURES (No real redundancy) 
Relief Valves - Converter Relief Valve 100-110 psig, System Relief Valve 120-140 psig 
Burst Discs - Converter outer shell - rupture point 3/8 in. dia. area, rupture pressure 
20% less than burst pressure of outer shell. 
Redundancies - Emergency Oxygen System, 50 cu. in. @ 1,800 psi 
Over Design -
Electro Static Charge Control - Bonding per N4IL-B-5087 
Other ­
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LOX - GOX Military C. M. Ramsey 
PRESENTERTYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: 
1. No known fires, explosions, or catastrophic failures.
 
2. See documentation list for failure data.
 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: (GFAE) Converters: Bendix, ARO-Firewel, Essex Cryogenics 
Relief Valve : Bendix, A.R.D.C. (Airborne Research & Devel. Corp.) 
(GFAE) MS27599 Regulators : Bendix, ARO-Firewel 
Breathing Flex. Hoses : R. E. Darling Co. 
Metallic Flex Hose : Tite Flex (SOD 32-8501k) 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials (SHE ATTACHED SHEET) 
Pressure Range -
Temperature Range -
Ddsign Considerations/Application Limitations -
Screening Tests -
Special Procedures -
Ignition Source Controls -
Failure Experience ­
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TOX - (ox Military C. M. Ramsey 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET --- Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range (SEE ATTACHIh SHEE'T) 
Class One, A, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Two, B, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Three, C, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS 
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T.O. 1F-4C-2-7 
* PROBE LEAD 
LIQUID OXYGEN QUICK DISCONNECT1
 
CONVERTER ENVELOPE COUPLINGS
 
33-CAAMI -

VENT LINE 
QUICK DISCONNECT I 
COUPLING 33-PAAM7 I 
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Figure 1. Liquid Oxygen System Schematic 
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OXYGEN LOW 
NORMAL OPERATION EMERGENCY OPERATION 
" 
 $FATR I" 
--SETAI
 
STNADIT STANDARD FLIGHT 
(PCCKPTFftWRD E FORAUTOMATIC EMERGENCYOXYGEN REtEASEI 
D'ING SEATEJECTION. SEAT RAISES ALONG 
' ."l.' .'-.- ./ . .HYPDY RELEASESTRIKERPLATE 17) TO PULLOXYGEN 
CYINERCYINER AFRCCKITL 
OTESTSEI 
2.OLQUIDOXYGNOMATER 
3. OYNUNERTENY 
NDICTOR 
__ 4. LIQUID OXYGEN REPAER INDICATOR. 
5. WARA-UP PLATE. . 
6. LIQUID OXYGEN CONVERTERAND 
ASSOCrATEDCOMPONENTS. 
7. EMERGENCYOXYGEN AUTOSAIC 
RELEASESTRIKERPlATE. 
S. DILUTERDEMAND OXYGEN REGULATOr. 
9. OXYGEN LOWQUANTIY WARNING LIGHT.1. EMERGENCY OXYGEN MANUAL RELEASE 
' 
IS. TRIPLEVER. 
VENT 
Figure 2. Standard Flight Gear Normal and Emergency Operation
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MATERIALS SATISFACTORY FOR USAGE IN AN OXYGEN ENVIRONMENT 
METALS: 
Aluminum Alloy 5052
 
Aluminum Alloy 6061T6
 
Stainless or corrosion-resistant steels - 301, 302, 347 
70-30 cupro-nickel alloy 
AMPO-2 4 alloy 
Copper
 
Beryllium copper alloy 25 
Cadmium, copper, nickel and chrome plating 
MON-METALLIC:
 
Plastics, Elastomers: 
KEL-F 81, 800 
Viton A, B 
Rulon A, B, C
 
Fluorel KX2141
 
Teflon
 
Aclar 330
 
Thread Lubricants:
 
Halocarbon oil series 13-21
 
Halocarbon grease series 25-10
 
IEL-F 90 grease
 
KEL-F oil No. 1
 
Molykote 2
 
Fluorolube S-30
 
Teflon tape per MIL-7-27730
 
MATERIALS NOT RECOMMENDED:
 
Metals:
 
Titanium
 
Magnesium
 
Zirconium alloys
 
Indium
 
Non-Metallic: 
Polyethylene
 
Buna N
 
Nylon
 
Neoprene
 
Polypropylene
 
Fluorosilicone Rubber
 
Polyurethane Insulation
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McDonnell-Douglas Documentation - F4 Series Aircraft
 
MIL-D-19326D 

MIL-C-19803D 

P.S. 12300 

P.S 20031 

P.S. 12020 

P.S. 17001 

P.S. 23600 

P.S. 17009 

Drawings
 
32-85018 

53-81042 

53-81043 

53-81033 

53-81063 

32-85013 

MS 27599 

32,85055 

32-85014 

32-85001 

32-85002 

32-81019 

Design and Installation of Liquid Oxygen Systems
 
In Aircraft, General Specification For
 
Converter, Liquid Oxygen, 10 Liter, GCU-24/A
 
(Process Spec.) P.S. 17009 - Oxygen Systems,
 
Liquid: Installation and Testing of
 
Cleaning and Capping of Fluid Carrying Parts and
 
Assemblies
 
Storage and Handling of Liquid Oxygen
 
Cleaning, Solvent Vapor Degreasing
 
Lines, Fluid (Except Oxygen) Installation Of
 
AGE Control Requirements
 
Oxygen Systems: Liquid, Install & Testing Of
 
Equipment Installation -LOX System
 
Oxygen Installation - Forward Cockpit (USAF)
 
Oxygen Installation - Aft Cockpit (USAF)
 
Pressure Suit Panel - Fwd. Cockpit (USAF)
 
Oxygen and Utility Panel - Aft Cockpit (USAF)
 
Oxygen Warm-up Plate (USAF/USN)
 
Diluter Demand Oxygen Regulator (USAF)
 
Spec. Control Dwg. - 10 Liter Oxygen Converter
 
Spec. Control Dwg. - Flexible Metal Lines Assembly
 
Oxygen Installation - Cockpit (USN)
 
Oxygen System Installation - Radar Operator
 
Panel Assembly - Oxygen and Utility
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McDonnell Douglas Documentation
 
32-90173 	 Acceptance Test Procedure - 10 Liter Converter
 
Excerpt from T.O. IF-4C-2-7 - Oxygen System
 
Description and Schematic
 
32A-483 	 Final Report - Test and Inspection of Two Discrepant
 
LOX Converters
 
NAVWEPS 03-50GCB-7 	 I.P.B. LOX Converter 21170-3 (ARO)
 
NAVWEPS 03-50GDB-9 I.P.B. LOX Converter 29073-81 (Bendix)
 
29073-Cl (Bendix)
 
W. L. Maddox Memo R-0225 24 April 1970
 
Failure Data on F-4 Oxygen System
 
Reference Data:
 
MIL-1-5585 - Installation of Low Pressure Oxygen Equipment in
 
Aircraft, General Specification for
 
MIL-I-8683 - Installation of Oxygen Equipment in Aircraft
 
MIL-I-9745 - Installation Design of Liquid Oxygen Systems in Aircraft,
 
General Specifications for 
MIL-I-19326- Installation and Tests of Liquid Oxygen Systems in 
Aircraft, General Specification tor 
NASA Report TM-X-985 
TM-X-53052 
TM-X-53773 
TM-X-53533
 
USAF (WADC) TM Report WCRD-TM-55-76
 
4o
 
3. 	Gemini 02 Bottle ­
by J. Kennedy, Garrett Corp 
(a) Description
 
(b) Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) Sketch
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GEMINI SUPERCRITICAL OXYGEN
 
SYSTEM OPERATION
 
The Gemini supercritical oxygen system consisted of two cryogenic tanks
 
and their associated controls and conditioning components. One tank
 
provided oxygen for the environmental control system and the other pro­
vided oxygen for the fuel cell. The operation of the two tanks was
 
essentially identical. The sequence was as follows:
 
Loading: Oxygen was loaded as a liquid at one atmosphere through
 
the fill valve. The gas generated during this process was released
 
through the vent valve. These two valves were then capped.
 
Pressure Buildup: The pressure within the storage system was
 
increased from one atmosphere to operating pressure (nominal 850 psia)
 
by the addition of heat. This heat came either from heat transfer across
 
the annulus insulation or from the operation of the internal heaters.
 
Fluid Delivery: Oxygen is supplied to the using systems (ECS o
 
fuel cell) on demand by the action of the pressure regulators. The
 
supply pressure within the cryogenic tanks is maintained by the ad­
dition of heat. Some of this heat is supplied by the heat transfer
 
across the annulus insulation and the remainder is supplied by the
 
internal electrical heaters. These heaters can be operated either
 
manually or automatically.
 
The storage containers themselves have several design features of special
 
interest. The inner pressure vessel is fabricated of Inconel 718. In­
side this vessel is a stainless steel capacitance probe and a copper ex­
tended surface heater. The electrical leads to the capacitance probe
 
are brought into the tank swaged in magnesium oxide encased in stainless
 
steel. These are two separate lines which terminate in glass to metal
 
seals inside the inner tank. Bare wires are run from this seal to the
 
capacitance probe. The insulators on the probe itself are all ceramic.
 
The heater leads are also brought into the tank swaged in magnesium ox­
ide encased in stainless steel. They are joined to the heater element
 
in a sealed boss on the inner tank. The heater is a resistance element
 
swaged in magnesium oxide and encased in stainless steel. This is
 
brazed to the copper extended surface. These are the only electrical
 
elements exposed to oxygen in the Gemini cryogenic system.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 DATE April 27, 1970 
MILITARY AVIATION 0 
SUBMARINE n 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
MSC CHAMBER 
0] 
0 PRESENTER John Kennedy 
HOSPITAL 0 
GEMINI 02 BOTTLE 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox X Lo Pressure Cox Hi Pressure Gox 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of Joints/Fittings - Welds, brazes, B-nuts 
Operating Life & Level,- 336 hrs. @ 100 naut. mi. orbit 
Shelf Life/Age Life - 18 months/18 -months 
Operating Environment & Limitations - Titan 11 launch followed by low earth orbit 
Special or Unique Component Designs - No 
Single Point Failures - All except pressure control valve 
Static Electric Charge Precautions - None 
Electrical Interfaces - Piping connectors at interfaces but no insulation exposed to oxygen 
Ignition Source Control - Cleanliness and no nonmetals in storage container 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special 
Handling Requirements/Inspections. 
Manufacture: Internal specs on all manufacturing materials and processes. 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: None 
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Lox Gemini O2 Rlotte "e- John Kennedy 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - Cpmplete 
Configuration Control(s) - Complete 
Certification/Recertifications - Fbrmal qualification and reliability 
Testing/Retesting - In-process testing and acceptance testing 
Material Control (Procedure) - Complete traceability on all significant' materials 
Parts Control - Serial numbering and traceability 
TESTING 
Philosophy' Qualification testing demonstrates design adequacy. Acceptance testing demonstrates
 
proper fabrication
 
Experience: 100 containers in Gemini, approximately 150 other space tanks 
Operational Certification: Qualification report 
Test Failures: 	 None significant, i.e., no structural failures, fires, or other catastrophic 
events 
SAFETY FEATURES
 
Relief Valves - Yes 
Burst Discs - No. But outer shell pinch tube serves as burst disc for outer shell 
Redundancies - On control functions only 
Over Design - 1.67 proof 2.22 burst 
Electro Static Charge Control - No special precautions 
Other - All electrical wires which are in contact with oxygen are bare. Whenever possible, 
electrical wires are encased in swaged stainless steel tubing with MgO insulation
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Lox Gemini On Bottle John Kennedy 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: GT-5 heater circuit (See Attached) 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: Honeywell - capacitance gauge 
Bourns - pressure transducer
 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials INCO 718, 347 S.S, 304 S.S, 321 S.S. 
Gu. Ni braze, Ag braze, AU Braze, Ti (5.0 AL, 2.5 Si ). 
Pressure Range - 0-1,000 psia 
Temperature Range - 1400 Rankin - 2,2000 Rankin 
Design Considerations/Application Limitations - INCO 718 pressure vessel S.S. fittings and -lines, 
cu. heat transfer surfaces. 
Screening Tests - None for flammability 
Special Procedures - Vacuum melt material, complete CMR on all material 
Ignition Source Controls - Absolute cleanliness 
Failure Experience - No material failures 
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Lox Gemini 0l2 TRntt1lpri, gnc~ 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
Class One, A, etc. Teflon, silicone rubber 
I. Pressure Range - 150 - 1,000 psia 
2. Temperature Range - -300 - +1600 F. 
3. Application Limitation - Valve seats and Orings 
4. Screening Test(s) - High pressure GOX cycling 
5. Special Procedure(s) - None -instorage containers 
6. Ignition Source Controls - No insulated electrical leads 
Class Two, B, etc. Teflon, silicone rubber, Viton 
I. Pressure Range - 50 - 150 psia 
2. Temperature Range - -65 to +1600 F. 
3. Application Limitation - Valve seats and 0 rings 
4. Screening Test(s) - High pressure GOX cycling 
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls - No electrical wiring 
Class Three, C, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS 
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GT-5 Heater Failure
 
The one operational failure which occurred during the Gemini cryogenic

tankage program occurred on GT-5. GT-5 launched with the Reactant
 
Supply System (RSS) oxygen tank heater on in the automatic mode. At
 
approximately 28 minutes GET a current spike occurred and the circuit
 breaker apparently tripped. When the pressure was observed to be drop­ping below the automatic control band, the circuit breaker was reset
 
by the crew. This did not activate the heater nor did an attempt to
 
operate in the manual mode. 
The actual failure was never identified
 
since the adapter section which contains the cryogenic tanks is not

recovered. It was established from the review of the available data
 
that the most probable cause was a short circuit to ground of a 28 volt
 
high lead some place before the heater element. This could have been
 
either tank wiring or vehicle wiring.
 
This failure left the tank with no source 
of pressurization energy

other than heat leak through the insulation. This was not adequate

to maintain supercritical operation and the pressure in this tank
 
fell from more than 800 psia to 65 psia over a period of several hours.
 
At this pressure, the fluid in the tank became two-phase and the
 
energy requirements for isobaric operation changed dramatically: The
 
energy required for liquid delivery under these conditions is such
 
that the pressure stabilized and began to rise. 
After a powered down
period of less than 24 hours, the normal mission was resumed. The tank
 pressure continued to rise throughout the mission and had reached 251
 
psia at the end of the mission. This occurred because the fluid in

the tank was oriented by surface tension effects such that the with­
drawal port saw liquid throughout the mission.
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4. 	Submarines
 
by Dr. J. E. Johnson,
 
Naval Research Lab
 
(a) Description
 
(b) Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) Sketch
 
(d) Bibliography
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Submarine Oxygen System
 
Oxygen gas is stored in the submarine in large flasks which are 18 inches
 
in diameter and up to 15 feet long with a maximum volume of 21 cu. ft.
 
Liquid oxygen is not normally carried in the submarine. Gaseous oxygen
 
is charged to 3,100 psi in the flasks from LOX either from the air plant
 
in the submarine tender (AS) which is identical to the plants on aircraft
 
carriers, or from dockside facilities.
 
A charging line is prepared to transfer the evaporated LOX into the sub­
marine gaseous oxygen storage system. The line must be copper tubing,
 
single piece as short as possible, with connectors only at the ends.
 
Connections are made with silver brazing couplings. Alternatively, lengths
 
of monel pipe together with two or three lengths of flexible metal hose
 
and monel couplings may be used. In either case, the entire charging line
 
shall be welded or silver brazed so that the only threaded connections are
 
at the ends. The charging line is hydrostatically tested to 4,500 psi and
 
cleaned with R-113, purged with dry, oil-free nitrogen. During charging,
 
applicable compartments in submarine are monitored with portable oxygen
 
analyzers. (Details of preparations; charging, and shut down are given
 
in BUSHIPS INSTRUCTION 9230.16)
 
In addition to external sources described above, oxygen is supplied from
 
electrolysis of water in plants aboard some nuclear submarines (Treadwell
 
generators). The oxygen is generated at 2100 psig pressure and the
 
by-product hydrogen gas also generated at 2,100 psig is discharged directly
 
to sea. The oxygen is carried either to storage banks or directly to dis­
posal. 120 SCFH of 02 is normally produced by one plant, which is usually
 
enough to supply the continuous demand for personnel breathing. Various
 
safety features are built into the operation of the oxygen generator.
 
Oxygen gas is dropped by regulators to 100 psig or lower for dispersal. Dispersal
 
is normally accomplished by bleeding oxygen through needle valves into
 
the submarine at several points using special diffusers at 2 to 3 psig.
 
An important aspect of the gaseous oxygen storage and distribution facilities
 
is maintaining them contaminant-free. When contamination of any part of sys­
tem is suspected, or repairs and replacement parts are required, cleaning and
 
purging is done using trichlorotrifluoroethylene according to MIL-STANDARD­
1330 (SHIPS). The trend is to use only nickel-copper or copper-nickel alloys
 
for all parts of the high pressure gaseous oxygen system including piping,
 
fittings, and valves. A recent change is to replace stainless steel end
 
plugs in oxygen flasks with monel plugs whenever cleaning of the flasks is
 
accomplished. Flasks themselves are still fabricated of corrosion resistant
 
steel in accordance with MIL-F-22606B(SHIPS).
 
A single line schematic flow diagram of the submarine oxygen distribution
 
system is attached. Additional specific details are included in the attached
 
specifications and documentation.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 DATE 4/28/70 
MILITARY AVIATION 0 
SUBMARINE 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 0 
MSC CHAMBER 0l PRESENTER Johnson/Kitts 
HOSPITAL 1' 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER OX SYSTEMS USE IDENTICAL COMPONENTS FOR PIPING
 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Only load-
Type of System(s) Lox 	 ing from Lo Pressure Gox 100 psiHi Pressure Gox 3 ,OOO psi 
tender 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
3,000 psi - Pipe, valves, fitting of nickel-copper alloy (monel). Diaphragm 
Type of Joints/Fittings valves with Teflon Kel-F disc inserts. All valves have welded nipples.Tp Pipe threads shall not be used. 
Socket ends for silver brazing 
Operating Life & Level - Components will be scrapped if inspection reveals excessive corrosion 
or thread galling. 
Shelf Life/Age Life - Indefinitely long - no scheduled retirement. 
Operating Environment & Limitations - External environment 65-800 F., 50-60% r.h., 1.0 atm. press. 
Special or Unique Component 	Designs - Keep all joints and interfaces to minimum. 
Single Point Failures - Redundance of system precludes SPF. 
Static Electric Charge Precautions - Permanently grounded 
Electrical Interfaces - No electrical penetration for instrumentation 
Isolation from electrolytic 02 plant.. 
Ignition Source Control - Quality control on 02 to eliminate metallic and organic sources of 
ignition. Electrical grounds. 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special 
Handling Requirements/Inspections. 
Manufacture: Systems are assembled from components mfd. to mil. specs.
 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: Cleaning of oxygen banks, piping systems, and components by flushing 
with trichlorotrifluoroethylene (ultra-clean) only. Testing for residual flushing solvent re­
quired. For any repair work, cleaning process must be repeated. All oxygen flasks shall have 
ORES plugs replaced by monel plugs at next onportunity. ALL COMPONENTS AND COMPETED SYSTEMS 
TESTED TO 1.5 TIMES MAX. OPERATING PRESSURE.
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PAGE 2 OF 4Submarine Hp COX Military Johnson/Kitts
 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER
 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - Based on experience and use
 
Configuration Control(s) - Modifications to systems incorporated during overhaul.
 
Certification/Recertifications - Quality assurance maintained by Govt. inspectors.
 
Testing/Retesting - Pressure tests required every time system is opened or system integrity is 
in doubt.
 
Material Control (Procedure) - Actual material is specified in mil. spi. for each component. 
Parts Control - All parts for replacement shall be of materials in strict accordance with 
material spec. shown of approved drawing. 
SYSTEM COMPONENT 
TESTING 
Philosophy: 	Test for contamination level--pressure According to spec. requirements.
 
test for leaks using N2 gas..
 
Experience: 	Systems can be operated safely if kept
 
clean and properly maintained.
 
Operational 	 Certification: After inspection, repair & Tested as part of system
cleaning, 15 min. hydrostatic 
test ta 1.5 times max. op. .peg. using ¢ieaning sol­
vent. Next 	pressure test w Vt mixed ggs
a2 Ireon-it 

Test Failures: 	 for 7 days. Max. hllowab le press. drop Repair or replace defective
is 5 psig (at 3,000 psi). Purge to component

free of Freon-12.
 
SAFETY FEATURES
 
For oxygen service, relief valves are used: body and spring housing are of
Relief Valves - monel, springs of bronze, monel, copper-nickel alloy; valve disc inserts of 
Burst Discs - Teflon (MIL-V-22549D(SHIPS)). 
Redundancies - No single point failure 
Over Design -

Electro Static Charge Control - All systems are to common ground
 
Other - Contamination and quality control of oxygen. Strict control of materials and
 
components according to mil. specs.
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c,,tmnrinp Bp CfX military Johnson/Kitts 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
- OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: From numerous sources 
(See Next Page Also)

METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials Copper, nickel-copper alloy, copper-nickel(for oxygen flasks use HY-80 
or F-22 (of ASTM A336) steel. 
Pressure Range - 3,000 psi op. pressure; 4 ,500psig hyprostatic test pressure 
Temperature Range- normal 65 -'80°F 
Design Considerations/Application Limitations - Compatibility with HP 02 
'Screening Tests - Experience 
Special Procedures - Surfaces must be clean to eliminate oil and hydrocarbons. 
Ignition Source Controls - Controlled by specific metal permitted 
Failure Experience - Few. Rave experienced at least one 02 bottle fire in which CRES end 
plug was burned almost completely. 
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Submarine Hp GOX 
 Military Johnson/Kitts
 
TYPE OF SYSTEM 
 COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW'WORK SHEET - Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
Class One. A, etc. Teflon, Kel-F Fluorolubes, Teflon tape, 
Kel-F oil
1. Pressure Range - 3,000 psi HP COX 3,000 psi HP GOX 
2. Temperature Range - Normal, 60-850 F. Normal, 60-850 F.
 
3. Application Limitation - Flange gaskets, valve disc Lubricants and thread compounds 
inserts
 
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) 
- Avoid direct contact with flow­
ing oxygen
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Two, B, etc. 
1. Pressure Range - 0-100 psig 
2. Temperature Range - Ambient 
3. Application Limitation - Stem packing--Teflon 
disc washer--Teflon or
4. Screening Test(s) - nylon 
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
METALS
 
Class 11#kt/ ,q, etc. 
Two Copper, bronze, Naval brass
 
1. Pressure Range - 0-100 psig 
2. Temperature Range - Ambient 
3. Application Limitation - pipe, valves, fittings 
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) 
­
6. Ignition Source Controls 
-
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS Plastics (other than flouorocarbons),rubber, 
cast iron, carbon ste&l, organic compounds. No greases with a petroleum base.
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External 
Charging 
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Hull uaran 
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-Hull Electrolysis 
1 psigGen. 
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0Gage0 3000 psi 02 Relief Valve 
02 Storage Bank 
SUBMARINE OXYGEN SYSTEM 
Reference Material On Submarine Oxygen Systems (Received 4/27/70)
 
1. Naval Ships Technical Manual, chapter 9230 "Industrial Gases; Generating,
 
Handling and Storage," NAVSHIPS 0901-230-0002, September 1967 edition.
 
2. General Specifications for Ships of the United States Navy, Department

of the Navy, Naval Ship Engineering Center, section 9230-1, "Compressed

Gas Systems" draft copy, supersedes section S23-1, dated 1 May 1958.
 
3. BUSHIPS Instruction 9230.12A, "Oxygen and Nitrogen Piping Systems,

Cleaning and Inspection of," BUSHIPS 9230.12A, Ser 648F-188, 8 Feb. 1961.
 
4. BUSHIPS Instruction 9230.15B, "High Pressure Air, Oxygen and Dry,

Oil-Free Nitrogen Systems, approved Lubricants and Thread Compounds for,"
 
BUSHIPS 9230.15B Ser 648F-2475, 27 Dec. 1962.
 
5. BUSHIPS Instruction 9230.16, "Submarine Oxygen Systems, Dockside
 
and Tender (AS) Charging and Off-Loading of,T BUSHIPS 9230.16, Ser.
 
648F-1300, 20 Aug. 1962.
 
6. Military Standard, "Cleaning andTesting of Oxygen and Nitrogen Gas
 
Piping Systems, " Mil-STD-1330(SfIPS), 10 May 1968.
 
7. Military Standard, "Schedule of Piping, Valves, Fittings, and Associated
 
Piping Components for Submarine Service," MIL-STD-438D(SHIPS), 30 Oct. 1969.
 
(See Category K-i and K-2)
 
8. Mil. Spec. "Flask, Compressed Gas and End Plugs for Air, Oxygen

and Nitrogen," MIL-F-22606B(SHIPS), 12 June 1964 (with Amendment -4)
 
9. MIL SPEC "Indjcators, Pressure, Bourdon Type," and others.
 
MIL-I-18997/I(SHIPS), 7 Mar. 1967
 
MIL-I-18997/2(SHIPS), 7 Mar. 1967
 
MIL-I-18997C(SHIPS), 6 Mar. 1967 and SUPPLEMENT-i.
 
10. MIL SPEC, "Bronze, Valve: Castings," MIL-B-16541B(WP) 3 Dec. 1964 (plus
 
Amend. l)
 
11. MIL SPEC, "Valves, Pressure Reducing, for Oxygen Service," MIL-V-24336
 
(SHIPS), 20 May 1968 (plus Amend.-1).
 
12. MIL SPEC "Valves, Angle, Relief, for Gas and Oxygen Service (Sizes

2-inches IP5 and Below); Naval Shipboard," MIL-V-22549D(SHIPS), 20 Sept.
 
1968.
 
13. MIL SPEC "Tube, Copper (Seamless)," MIL-T-24107(SHIPS), 10 Mar. 1965.
 
14. MIL SPEC "Fittings, Tube, Cast Bronze, Silver-Brazing," MIL-F-1183E,
 
24 Julyl1961, (plus Amend.-1).
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15. MIL SPEC "Tube, 70.30 and 90-10 Copper-Nickel Alloy, Seamless and
 
Welded," MIL-T-16420J(SHIPS), 4 Mar 1965 (plus Amend.-3)..
 
16. MIL SPEC "Pipe, Stainless Steel, (Corrosion-Resistant), Seamless
 
or Welded," MIL-P-1144B(SHIPS), 18 Oct. 1962 (plus Amend.-l).
 
17. MIL SPEC "Tube and Pipe, Nickel-Copper Alloy,'Seamless and Welded,"
 
MIL-T-1368C, 2 June 1965, (plus Amend.-2).
 
18. FED SPEC "Nickel-Copper Alloy Bar, Plate, Rod, Sheet, Strip, Wire,
 
Forgings, and Structural and Special Shaped Sections," QQ-N-281b, Oct. 31,
 
1966.
 
19. FED SPEC "Brass, Naval, etc.," QQ-B-637a, Mar. 14, 1967.
 
20. NRL Ltr. Rpt. "Fire in oxygen make-up system for pressure chambers
 
used for manned exposures," 6180-48A:FWW:JEJ:ec of 3 May 1968.
 
21. NRL Ltr. Rpt. "Aviators breathing oxygen from aircraft converters,
 
evaluation of:" 6180-176A:FWW:ec of 20 Nov. 1968.
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DRAWINGS
 
Diagram, "SS(N)637-501-2142136.
 
(Newport News S.&D.D. No. 273-325).
 
Diagram, "ASR21-513-4369845, Rev. B" Sheet 1 and 2.
 
Submarine Rescue Ship, ASR21, "Compressed Gas System Diagram."
 
Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co., Mobile, Ala.
 
Miscellaneous BuShips Drawings
 
1385941, Sheets 1 and 2, "Fittings, Silver Brazed, WOG, for 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385943, Sheets 1 and 2, " Unions, Sil Brzg, 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385946, "Unions, Bronze, Silver Grazing, WOG".
 
1385950, "Bosses, Non-Ferrous Piping, 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385963, Sheets I and 2, "Fittings, Silver Brazing Ni-Al-Brz for 1500 & 3000
 
PSI%. 
1385846, Sheets 1-4, "Oxygen Systems, Submarines, Replenishment" Schematic 
Piping Diagram.
 
1385859, "Union, Bronze, Silver Brazing Alloy, Low Pressure Service 800-1500 
PSIG". 
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5. 	 Aircraft Carriers 
by W. Kitts, PSC 
(a) 	Description
 
(b) 	Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) 	Systems Schematic
 
(d) 	Bibliography
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Aircraft Carrier Oxygen System (CVA)
 
The source of oxygen on the Navy aircraft carrier is the air separation

plant which produces,by distillation,liquid oxygen and liquid nitrogen.

Each aircraft carrier is equipped with two such air separation plants

which are located on the hangar deck level, one forward and 9ne aft in
 
outboard compartments. 
The liquid products are transferred from the air
 
separation plant to storage as 
liquid or gaseous products. Each air
 
separation plant is capable of producing liquid oxygen at the rate of
 
110 lbs./hr. or 1.32 tons/day or producing liquid oxygen and liquid ni­
trogen simultaneously.
 
The cryogenic storage system consists of two liquid tanks suspended inside
 
a single outer shell. The insulating space between the tanks and shell
 
are filled with perlite insulating material and evacuated to provide in­
sulation against heat leakage. 
The storage systems piping includes pres­
surizing controls to each tank to permit increasing the gas pressure
 
over the liquid for liquid withdrawal or transfer. 
 Each tank is equipped

with pressure controls, instrumentation, valves, relief valves, burst
 
discs, liquid level gages, and vacuum gages to permit ease of operation

and to prevent dangerous pressure levels from building up in the storage

tanks. The normal capacity of the liquid oxygen storage tank is 750
 
gallons of LOX with a 10 percent vapor space provided for the expansion

of the stored liquid as it vaporizes.
 
A liquid oxygen fill bench is provided to fill removed aircraft liquid

oxygen converters at a remote compartment adjacent to the oxygen plant on the hangar

deck level. The aircraft converters can also be fiiled in the aircraft
 
on the flight deck level by utilizing portable 50-gallon storage tanks.
 
The portable storage tanks are replenished from the main 750 gallon LOX
 
storage tank on the hangar deck level.
 
Each oxygen plant is equipped with a liquid oxygen pump and vaporizing
 
system to produce high pressure (3,000 psig) gaseous oxygen from the liquid

product. 
The pump is a single cylinder, positive displacement reciprocating
 
pump driven by a crosshead connecting rod, crankshaft, and electric motor
 
assembly. The pump and vaporizer assembly is capable of producing gaseous

oxygen at a maximum rate of 25,000 standard cubic foot per hour at ambient
 
temperature and at a maximum pressure of 3,500 psig. 
The gaseous oxygen

is pumped into the ships storage system wherein it is manifolded into con­
necting piping which distributes the gaseous product to the ships oxygen

piping system for various uses 
as high and low pressure gas throughout

the ship. A single line schematic flow .diagram of the aircraft carrierts
 
oxygen distribution system is attached.
 
Additional specific details are included in the attached specifications
 
and documentation.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 DATE 29 April 1970 
MILITARY AVIATION 0 
SUBMARINE 0 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER [/ 
MSC CHAMBER 0 PRESENTERKites/Johnson 
HOSPITAL 0 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox X Lo Pressure Gox Hi Pressure Gox 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of Joints/Fittings - Pipe, valves, and fittings of stainless steel; socket weld fittings 
and joints are composed of 316L stainless steel.
 
Operating Life & Level - Components replaced when inspection reveals defects or damaged in use.
 
Shelf Life/Age Life - Indefinite. 
Operating Environment & Limitations - -2970 F. to 1200 F., exposed to salt or sea spray 
sea level pressure, maximum internal operating pressure - 3,500 psig. 
Special or Unique Component Designs - Cryogenic transfer lines of double wall or vacuum­jacketed construction. Keep all connections, welds, and interfaces to a minimum.
 
Single Point Failures -Redundancy of the system precludes SPF.
 
Static Electric Charge Precautions - LOX transfer lines are grounded.
 
Electrical Interfaces - No electrical interfaces required for instrumentation.
 
Ignition Source Control - Electrical grounds, acetylene tests required for LOX storage tanks
 
at 90 day intervals.
 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special 
Handling Requirements/Inspections. 
Manufacture: Components assembled to meet military specifications.
 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: All oxygen systems shall be cleaned in accordance with requirements 
of MIL-STD-1330. Freon 113 solvent is used. All repair parts shall be identical in material
 
and quality of those originally furnished with the valve or component.
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SiTi-flat 
Aircraft carrier LOX military Kitts/Johnson PAGE 2 OF 4 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - Based on experience while in use. 
Configuration Control(s) - Modifications to the systems are made during the normal overhaul period 
at the shipyard.
 
Certification/Recertifications 
- QA coverage provided by Naval inspectors. The original oxygen plant9ertification is accomplished at the shipbuilders yard with Navy surveillance and recertified 
urn the normal overhaul period.
estingketesting - Compone 
Material Control (Procedure) - Components are procured to meet ril. spec. requirements. The basic 
oxygen plant must demonstrate satisfactory performance to Navy shipboard specifications.
Parts Control - Quality control is provided to assure that parts are cleaned and are of identi­
cal materials for LOX service as the original. 
TESTING 
A gas sample is obrained from the system to ascertain the system cleanliness level
Plqosophy: and to meet the criteria and requirements for LOX. The system integrity must be 
verified by leak testing and free of contaminants. 
Experience: Experience indicates that safety cannot be over-emphasized and is a prime considera­
tion in safe handling and production of cryogenic liquids.
 
Operational Certification: For new ships plant certification for LOX is obtained at the shipyard under 
naval inspector scrutiny to assure that the plant produces LOX to the 
purity and quantity required by the specificatiosn. 
Test Failures: During overhaul periods, the carrierls LOX plants are cleaned, purged, leak tested 
and operated to verify plant performance for recertification. 
SAFETY FEATURES
 
Relief Valves - For oxygen service relief valves and burst discs are used for overpressure 
conditions. Burst discs are used as a second level of protection on LOX tanks.
 
Burst Discs -
Redundancies - Two complete plants are installed on each aircraft carrier.
 
Over Design -
Electro Static Charge Control - All LOX and GOX systems are grounded. 
Other - An automatic sprinkling system is activated by thermostatic controls located in the 
floor of the LOX plants on carriers. In the event of mass spillage of LOX, the system is 
actuated when the floor temperature reaches 00 F. 
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Aircraft carrier LOX military Kitts/Johnson 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: From several sources to meet the applicable military specifications for 
LOX and COX service. 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials Copper, nickel copper, bronze, CRES type 316 L 
Pressure Range - 3,000 psi for LOX pump and vaporizer 
Temperature Range - -2970 F. to 1200 F. 
Design Considerations/Application Limitations - System must be compatible for LOX and have pump and 
vaporizing capability to supply gaseous oxygen for the carriers requirement.
 
Screening Tests -

Special Procedures. - Cleaning to rigid requirements to eliminate oil, grease, and hydrocarbons.
 
Procedures are used to limit and prevent acetylene buildup in LOX storage tanks.
 
Ignition Source Controls -
Failure Experience ­
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LOX, aircraft carrier military Kitts. Johnson
 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
Class One, A, etc. Teflon, Kelf 
1. Pressure Range - 0 - 3,000 psi in pump and vaporizing unit, reduced to 100 psi or less 
for specific uses.
 
2. Temperature Range - -2970 F. to 1200 F. 
3. Application Limitation - Valves seats and packing 
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Two, B, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range ­
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Three, C, etc. 
1. Pressure Range ­
2. Temperature Range 
3. Application Limitation ­
4. Screening Test(s)"­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS Plastics (other than 'fluorocarbnn.ubber, cast iron, 
carbon steel, organic compounds are not permitted. No grease, oils, or petroleum base products
 
can be used.
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Liquid 02 
Converter l LOX DR 
Fill Bench _02V 1-.
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0 PlantxAft 
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"/ Storage 
IO02 OXYGEN 
02---LOX.D0--- OXYGEN VENT 
-+-L0X+-- LIQUID OXYGEN PIPINGKTYPICAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER OXYGEN SYSTEM 
'REFERENCEMATERIAL OR AIRCRAFT CARRIER OXYGEN SYSTEMS
 
Received 4/24/70 from Ships Command, Military Spec's.
 
1. 	MIL-P-23638A (Ships) 11 October 1963
 
Plant; for Producing, Storing, Pumping and vaporizing Liquid Oxygen
 
and Liquid Nitrogen (Shipboard type)
 
2. 	MIL-S-23639A (Ships) 11 October 1963
 
System for Liquid Oxygen and Liquid Nitrogen Storage and Charging;
 
(Shipboard type)
 
3. 	MIL-D-19326D; 29 September 1966
 
Design and Installation of Liquid Oxygen Systems in Aircraft, General
 
Specification for
 
4. 	MIL-C-19803D; 18 January 1968
 
Converter, Liquid Oxygen, 10 Liter, GLU-24A
 
5. 	MIL-V-25514C (USAF); 28 September 1965
 
Valve, Oxygen Check, for 70-psi Oxygen Converters
 
6. 	MIL-V-25513A (ASG); 21 November 1956
 
Valve, Oxygen Check, for 300-psi Oxygen Converters
 
7. 	MIL-I-81387 (AS); 1g July 1966
 
Indicators, Liquid Oxygen Quantity
 
8. 	MIL-R-25410F; 15 January 1968
 
Regulators, Oxygen, Diluter-Demand, Automatic-Pressure Breathing
 
9. 	MIL-0-23678A; 29 September 1966
 
Oxygen Systems, Portable
 
10. 	 MIL-H-22343A (AS); 16 January 1968
 
Hose Assemblies, Metal, Liquid Oxygen
 
11. 	 MIL-S-81018A (AS); 5 August 1966
 
Survival Kit Container, Aircraft Seat, with Oxygen; 

for
 
12. 	 MIL-O-27210D-(A$G); 16 May 1969
 
Oxygen, Aviator's Breathing, Liquid and Gas
 
13. 	 MIL-T-27730A(ASG); 15 April 1964
 
General Specification
 
Tape, Antiseize, Polytetrafluoroethylene, with Dispenser
 
14. 	 MIL-H-26626A; 1 April 1966
 
Hose Assembly, Tetrafluoroethylene, Oxygen
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15. 	 MIL-C-25969A (USAF); 19 November 1959
 
Capsule Emergency Escape Systems General Requirements for
 
16. 	 MIL-V-25961C (ASG); 21 June 1965 & Amend's 2 & 3
 
Valve, Fill-Buildup-Vent, Liquid Oxygen Converter, CRU-501A
 
17. 	 MIL-V-9050D (ASG); 11 April 1968 & Amend I
 
Valve, Oxygen, Pressure Relief, Aircraft
 
18. 	 MIL-T-8506A; 14 December 1966
 
Tubing, Steel, Corrosion-Resistant, (304), Annealed, Seamless
 
and Welded
 
19. 	 MIL-V-7908A; 5 March 1965 & Amend 1
 
Valves, Check, Aircraft Low Pressure Oxygen Systems
 
20. 	 MIL-H-7138D; 29 September 1966 & Amend I
 
Hose Assemblies, Oxygen Breathing, Connector to Regulator
 
21. 	 MIL-E-5272C (ASG); 13 April 1959 & Amend I
 
Environmental Testing, Aeronautical and Associated Equipment,
 
General Specification for
 
22. 	 MIL-T-38170D (USAF); 26 April 1967 & Amend 3
 
Tank, Storage, Liquid Oxygen TMU-27/M
 
23. 	 NAVWEPS 06-30-501; 1 August 1959
 
Handbook Field Handling of Liquid Breathing Oxygen
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1. 	 Technical Manual - NAVSHIPS 323-0049
 
Liquid Oxygen Tank 150 Gallon Horizontal
 
Model NALO-150S
 
2. 	 Technical Manual - NAVSHIPS 323-0094
 
Liquid Oxygen-Nitrogen Plant
 
Model J6287
 
3. 	 Technical Manual - NAVSHIPS 323-0055
 
Shipboard Oxygen-Nitrogen Generating Plant
 
Model LGSB 80-30
 
4. 	 Technical Manual - NAVSHIPS 3-23-0095
 
1500 Gallon Liquid Nitrogen/Oxygen Storage and Charging System
 
Model RC-5
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DRAWINGS
 
Diagram, "H-90613-504-4323961, Rev. A"
 
Aircraft Carrier CVA(N)68, Diagram of 02N 2 SYS Showing Hose Coverage
 
on Flight Deck"
 
(Newport News H594-2732-41).
 
Diagram, "H-80064-800-2640670, Rev. B"
 
Attack Aircraft Carrier, CVAN68 Arrangement of Machinery, Forward
 
and Aft, 02 and N2 plant.-

Diagram, Nav Ships No. ATS-1,545,2671412, Rev. B
 
Brooke Marine No. Ship No. 362.
 
Salvage Tug, ATS-I-Class, Diag. Arrangement of High Pressure Mixed
 
Gas Systems
 
Nay Ships No. C-90613-504-4323960, Rev. A. Sheets 1-22.
 
Aircraft Carrier CVAN68, Diag. 02/N2 System, Notes, Tables and
 
Materials.
 
Newport News. No. H594-2732-40.
 
Miscellaneous BuShips Drawings
 
1385941, Sheets 1&2, "Fittings, Silver Brazed, WOG, for 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385943, Sheets l&2, "Unions, Sil Brzg, 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385946, "Unions, Bronze, Silver Grazing, WOG".
 
1385950, "Bosses, Non-Ferrous Piping, 3000 PSI Service".
 
1385963, Sheets l&2, "Fittings, Silver Brazing Ni-Al-Brz for 1500 & 3000 PSI".
 
1385846, Sheets 1-4, "Oxygen Systems, Submarines, Replenishment" Schematic
 
Piping Diagram.
 
1385859, "Union, Bronze, Silver Brazing Alloy, low pressure service 800-1500 PSIC"
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6. Hospital Oxygen Systems
 
by Dr. C. K. la Pinta, MSC
 
ana Dr. R. A. Mahugh, Boeing
 
(a) Description
 
(b) Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) Sketch
 
(d) Bibliography
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OXYGEf SYSTE4
 
VETERANS ADMINISTBA.TION HOSPITAL
 
Houston, Texas
 
April 24, 1970
 
Oxygen is normally supplied from a liquid oxygen container in which
 
the pressure is approximately 70 pounds per square inch. From the
 
liquid container the oxygen line is connected to a duplex manifold
 
assembly, to the other side of whihh is attached 14 each, 300 cu. ft.
 
oxygen cylinders for standby reserve. The manifold arrangement
 
consists of pressure regulators, gages, header valves and relief valves, 
adjusted in such a manner that oxygen is delivered to the distribution 
system at 60 pounds per square inch pressure. In the event the pres­
sure should drop to 44 pounds, oxygen is admitted to the system from 
the reserve cylinders. 
When the reserve system is activated as a result of a pressure drop 
to 44 pounds per square inch, an alarm is sounded in the admitting 
office and a warning light is activated. The alarm may be silenced,
 
but the warning light will remain on until normal service is restored. 
In the event pressure should fall to approximately 39 pounds per square 
inch, an alarm is sounded in each ward and facility where oxygen is 
used. Simultaneously with the sounding of the alarm a red light is
 
activated, indicating low pressure. In the event of complete loss
 
of pressure another red light is activated, indicating oxygen failure.
 
All of the above alarms may be silenced, but the lights will continue
 
to glow until service is restored to normal. 
The relief valve connected to an extension manifold assembly is
 
asjusted to open at approximately 80 pounds per square inch.
 
The liquid oxygen storage/converter unit is supplied by the GSA con­
tracted vendor. Currently, American Cryogenics (La Porte, Texas)
 
has the contract to supply both liquid and gaseous oxygen as well as
 
a 1,320-gallon LOX facility.
 
The storage/converter unit is of standard design and was built by

the Cosmodyne Corporation (Torrance, Calif.). Construction is of
 
type 304 stainless steel, anodized aluminum, bronze, and brass, with
 
Teflon used as the valve packing material. All joints are either
 
welded (preferred method), all metal fittings (e.g., swagelock), or
 
flanged. Screw connections are avoided as are nonmetal seals. Valves,
 
both relief and shut-off, are of hard-seat (brass or other copper alloy)
 
design with Teflon stem packing. Cosmodyne depends heavily on air­
craft and space hardware manufacturers for approved methods and
 
materials recommendations.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0D DATE 27 Apr 70 
MILITARY AVIATION 0 
SUBMARINE 0 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER 0 
MSC CHAMBER 0 PRESENTER Dr. R. Mahugh 
HOSPITAL RI Dr. C.K. La Pinta 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox 70 psi Lo Pressure Gox 60 psi Hi Pressure Gox 2200 psi 
SYSTEM DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of Joints/Fittings - Tubing per Fed Spec WW-T-799 Silver Solder per Fed Spec QQ-S-561, 
Class 3 Screw joints made with a luting compound. 
Operating Life & Level - No information given 
Shelf Life/Age Life - No information given 
Operating Environment & Limitations - No information given 
Special or Unique Component Designs - CGA--D.I.S.S (Diameter 'ndex Safety System) Connector No. 
1240. Gages shall be U.L. listed for oxygen service. 
Single Point Failures - No Protection (except alarm) beyond automatic reserve switcl -over. 
Static Electric Charge Precautions -System is all-metal, grounded 
Electrical Interfaces -No internal (to oxygen) circuits, components cleaned and prepared for oxygen 
per cleaning nrocedure. 
Ignition Source Control - Use low pressure (regulated), no rapid oressurization, system grounded, 
hoses made of conductive neoprene.
 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special 
Handling Requirements/Inspections. 
Manufacture: 	 NFPA 565 shall apply. All items cleaned with Na2 C03 or NaP04 (1 # to 3 gals. H20 ) 
Water rinsed, dried and packed especiall'- for 02 service. Tubing-same, with ends 
sealed with 	wooden plugs or soldered caps.
 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: 
All work per NFPA 565.
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C.'ml_flli 
DR. R. M AUGP 2
 
LOX-GO. VA HOSPITAL DR. C. La Pinta PAGE 2 OF 4 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - N.I.G.
 
Configuration Control(s) -All valves shall be 1/4 turn, of same manufacture 
andof similar design. 
Certification/Recertifications 
- NONE 
Testing/Retesting - Test piping with air at 200 psi or 11 times (l.p.) working pressure--final 
test-24 hrs with 02, no leaks.Material Control (Procedure) - Specific use of non-ferrous metals, snecs call'for copper tubingper 
Fed Spec i4-T-561, class 3Parts shall be supplied by-a mfr of oxygen system components 
TESTING 
Philosophy: Acceptance test only - for leakage and delivery of approx. 99% 02 at-service 
outlets. All testing is with soap solution---no leaks are permitted. 
Experience: N.I.G. 
Operational Certification: N.I.G. 
Test Failures: N.I.G. 
SAFETY FEATURES NFPA 565 shall apply 
Relief Valves - on each cylinder or LOX converter; also on low pressure line, set to 1.5 times 
system pressure. Must re-seat after relief.Burst Discs -
Redundancies - Multiple cylinders, check valve isolation for failure--at least two sources of 
supply at all times, automatically switched. 
Over Design -
Electro Static Charge Control - Grounded system- loses low pressure) of conductive neoprene 
Other - High pressure storage or bulk storage shall be located in a separate room or 
enclosure, per NFPA 566. Quantity and pressure alarm systems, per NFPA 565. All
 
quick-disconnect couplings use C.G.A. D.I.S.S fittings.
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Dr. R. Mahugh PAGE 3 OF 4
 
LOX-GOX VA Hospital Dr. C. K. La Pinta 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL.. ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: No failures in 17 yrs. at Houston, Texas VA Hospital 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS: Both storage :hank/converter and LOX are on GSA contract. American 
Cryogenics is the current contractor. Storage vessels converter unit is manufactured by

Cosmodyne--uses gages, regulators, etc., from various manufacturers. Much of the hospital
 
system components are supplied by National Cylinder Gas Co.
 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials Copper and copper alloys, cast bronze, 
aluminum on low pressure outlets, CRES 
on outlet boxes. 
Pressure Range -
Temperature Range -
Design Considerations/Application Limitations -
Screening Tests -
Special Procedures -
Ignition Source Controls -
Failure Experience - No failures in 17 yrs. at the Houston, Texas VA Hospital 
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PAGE 4 OF 4
Dr. l ahugb 
Tn4-DXL VA HOSPITAL Dr. La Pinta 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
Class One, A, etc. Hi pressure System 
L Pressure Range - 150-3000 psi 
2. Temperature Range - Ambient 
3. Application Limitation - MIay use Teflon seats in valves---no oils or greases 
permitted

4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Two, B, etc. 
1. Pressure Range - 50-150 psi 
2. Temperature Range - ambient 
3. Application Limitation - May use Teflon or neoprene seats in valves 
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls -
Class Three, C, etc. Low pressure outlets and tents 
1. Pressure Range - up to 50 psi 
2. Temperature Range - Ambient 
3. Application Limitation - Tents of slow burning material, e.g., cellulose acetate 
Hoses of conductive neonrene
 
4. Screening Test(s) ­
5. Special Procedure(s) ­
6. Ignition Source Controls - No electrical devices, no hydrocarbon liquids or gases, signing tc 
prol ibit open flame or smoking 
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS 
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Bldg, No. 26D Bldg. No. 26C Bldg. No. 6 Bldg. No. 4
 
AliFloors Ward No. 108 Wards No. 106 206, 306 Wards No. 104, 204, 304 & CBOC
 
PS pg B PS Vent LineB& 	 Relief Valve 
Pretcre 
Independent of Main System No.1A JB 
Alarm System for Bldg.No. 26D JB 	 Low/ 
M A-Wred Wr. to Adm. Office 
A & D Office 400 lb reg. set 
70 lbs Line Pressure on 60 lb LP 
U ]_~xygen To Emergency Reserve 
1000 Gals.eu Valve Open (14 cylidr 
Comes in when pressure 44 lbs 2,200 isBldg. No. 1 
5h,.6th, 7h 	 JB Drops to 44 bs. OUT - IN5th, b  t 
FloorsMain disconect to alarm system located
 
on wall over drinking fountain,basement
 
corridor, Bldg. No. 1
 
SOxjrgen House
 
((Red Light) )
 
Point Al PS 
 I 

'"ospital Supply Line 
Jfl Connection inside brace shop for hook-ip 
P 	 se --PS
,S 	 to emergency bank furnished by Vendor 
Bldg. No. 104 Bldg No 103 Bldg. No. 101 Bldg. No.3 NOE Ticonton
 
Ward No. lg13 Ward No. 107 WadsNo.105,205 Wards No. 103, /
WariNo;111 NOTE: This connection isto
and 305 203, 303 connect temporary cylinders 
when repairs to manifold are 
KEY: JB - Junction Box being performed 
PS - Pressure Switch (Wired to alarms irareas where oxygen is used) 
NOTE: Setting for all pressure switches -45 psi 	 OXYGEN SUPPLY & ALARM SYSTEM AND OXYGEN SUPPLY 
CONTROL PANEL, BLDG. NO. 27 
Veterans Administration Hospital, Houston, Texas 
LEGENDi 
Check Valves 
Cylinder Valve To outside of building Relief Valve 
< Safety Relief 
Device 
Supply Piping Syst 
O0perating 
ntrol Unit 
-
Pressure 
Valve 
SecodaryBankLine 
Regulator 
tReserve 
Bleeer VlveI '-
_ _ I ~ 
i 
~Regultn avPressure 
Regulating Valve 
ehage OverAlarm Switch 
Pressure 
Regulating Valve 
0,1 
Operating Selector 
Primary Supply Secondary Supply 
(Liquid Cylinders 250 psig) 
Operating Supply may consist of one or more supply units on each bank. 
Reserve Supply 
(High Pressure Cylinders) 
2200 psig 
FIGURE 2.- TYPICAL OXYGEN CYLINDER SUPPLY SYSTEM WITH RESERVE SUPPLY 
HOSPITAL DQCUMENTATION­
1. 	Simple Schematic from Houston VA Hospital
 
2. 	National Fire Codes, National Fire Protection Association,
 
Vol. 2, 1966-67
 
Section565-1 Nonflammable Medical Gas Systems
 
Section 566-1 Bulk Oxygen Systems at Consumer Sites
 
3. 	Specifications 691B Hospital Oxygen System
 
VA Bulletin, Section 311
 
4. 	Narrative of Houston VA Hospital Oxygen System
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7. 	MSC Chamber
 
by W. H.. Bush, MC
 
(a) Description
 
(b) Operational System Work Sheet
 
(c) Sketch
 
(d) Bibliography
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MSC - Chamber (li-ft. - Bldg. 7)
 
Description - Bldg. 7 Oxygen Supply and Distribution System and 11-ft.
 
Chamber Open.Loop Environmental Control System (OLECS)
 
The oxygen systems involved in the operations of the li-ft. chamber will
 
be divided into two major catagories for simplification of description.
 
These are the (l)o Bldg. 7 Oxygen Supply and Distribution System and
 
(II) Open Loop ECS.
 
I. The Bldg. 7 oxygen distribution system is supplied by a high
 
pressure (2,200 psi) gaseous tube trailer as primary, 50,000 cu. ft.
 
capacity, with a 3,750 cu. ft. K bottle secondary bank. The secondary
 
is used in-event of component-failures or primary supply depletion. The
 
primary oxygen is supplied through high flow regulators in the Bldg. 7
 
distribution system at a nominal pressure of 100 psi. The primary and
 
secondary systems are plumbed through an automatic source switch-over sy9tem
 
activated by redundant electronic pressure switches, to the chamber and oc
 
cupants. There are safety relief valves and burst disks on each individual
 
line segment and regulators to provide and insure described working pres­
sure. There is approximately 1,500 cu. ft. of high pressure oxygen (2,200
 
psi) available at the chamber from an independent K bottle source.
 
II. The ll-ft. chamber Open Loop Environment Control System (OLECS)
 
is designed to provide an open loop flow of 100% oxygen between 6 and 12
 
ACFMbfor each of two space suited test subjects in the chamber at absolute
 
pressures between 3.7 and 21 psia. This system will maintain space suit
 
pressures from a few inches of water above, to 3.7 psi above chamber pres­
sure. The chamber can be evacuated to a few microns of mercury. The
 
open loop gas is discharged into a separate vacuum system. The oxygen
 
flow is used for both breathing and the removal of metabolic heat generated
 
by the suited subjects. The OLECS is supplied by the 100 psig oxygen from
 
the Bldg. 7 oxygen distribution (I) system. In event of a system malfunction
 
95 psi 02 is supplied across a limiting orifice to supply 12 ACFM to the
 
suit, also barostats sensing suit pressure will automatically repressurize
 
the chamber to a safe level in the event of a suit pressure failure.
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COMMERCIAL AVIATION 0 DATE 4-29-7o 
MILITARY AVIATION 03 
SUBMARINE 0 
AIRCRAFT CARRIER El 
MSC CHAMBER 13 PRESENTERL. . Casey 
HOSPITAL El 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET 
Type of System(s) Lox Lo Pressure Gox X Hi PreSsure Gox X 
0-100 psig 0-2200 psig 
SYSTEM. DESIGN STANDARDS AND FEATURES 
Type of foints/Fittings - V threaded, welded, & flared. Permanent larger 
joints welded. Small tubing flared. 
Operating Life & Level - Permanent facility with scheduled and unscheduled.maintenance 
capability. Can operate nearly continuously.
 
Shelf Life/Age Life - Replace components when they fail only - routine checkout procedures 
identify. failures.
 
Operating Environment & Limitations - Normal laboratory building environments in regards 
to temperature & humidity. Relative clean and vibration n-cc, 
Special or Unique Component Designs - None - off the shelf commercial equipment used through 
out the system
 
Single Point Failures No credible (not considering structural & wire breakage) single point 
,failures allowed by failure modes and effects
 
Static Electric Charge Precautions - Building grounded and system tied to ground. Ground GOX 
trailer prior to connection to.
 
Electrical Interfaces - None other than crew compartments ox space suit interiors 
Ignition Source Control - Dynamic system analysis, nonmetallic material usage location 
review & control. Electrical component minimization and fusing of all )ires. Hermet­
ically seal electronics.
 
PROCESS CONTROL SPECIFICATIONS - Electrical Interface/Contamination Levels/Special 
Handling Requirements/Inspections. 
Manufacture:Electrical: Fusing each wire, wire sizing . teflon insulation, potting hermetically 
sealing electronic circuits, grounding. No switching, no motors, etc.
 
Nonmetallic Materials: Selecting & screening, covering, testing. Cleaning & Sampling:
 
Service, Maintenance & Repair: Inspect all work; control all work on configuration and quality 
Quality and cleanliness
documents, periodically system cleanliness is sampled and certified. 

of all oxygen and connections is maintained.
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GOX MSC Chamber L..0. -_asey, 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET -- Continued 
'MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND CONTROLS TO ENSURE SAFETY & RELIABILITY 
FMEA, etc. - Formal analysis per written FMFA procedures. No single -point failures allowed. 
Configuration Control(s) - Work, documentation & materials are all controlled and inspected to­
show current status and instruction adherence. 
Certification/Recertifications - Certified as an operating system by periodic testing in all modes. 
Recertified operational prior to each manned test by written checklists
 
Testing/Retesting -
Material Control (Procedure) - All nonmetallic materials are selected, per established criteria 
Parts Control - Procurement inspection for nonmetallic material compliance. Control of 
quality of oxygen (batch sampling). 
TESTING 
Philosophy: Test system in all modes to insure workability. Overpressure to 1.5 operating 
pressure and determine leaks. 
Experience: No major problems. Sections of 100 psi header made of copper was very difficult 
to make leak tight.
 
Operational Certification: Operational readiness inspection and manned test readiness review 
boards.
 
Test Failures: None -significant. 
SAFETY FEATURES
 
Relief Valves - On each individual line segment 
Burst Discs - in series with relief valves To eliminate single point failures 
Redundancies -Supplies, regulators, & check valves 'here a single item would create a 
single point failure
 
Over Design - aSME code 
Electro Static Charge Control - Grounding of system and supply trailers 
Other - All overpressure reliefs are vented out of the building 
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GOX MSC Chamber L. 0. Casey 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM.. MIL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Continued 
OPERATIONAL FAILURE EXPERIENCE: 
'"None of a .catastrophic nature.
 
Miscellaneous components fail from time to time due to wear. None have occurred while system
 
was in use. All failures are picked up in pretest system verifications. No fire or explosive
 
tvpe failures have been recorded.
 
MAJOR SUPPLIERS:
 
Jamesbury, Victor, Rego, Hoke, Whitey
 
METALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials 
All applications are generally within Stainless steel is chosen 
room or habitat environments with pressure limited for all high pressure ap-
Pressure Range - to 2,500 psi. (This applies 
to all items below.) 
plications. Stainless 
steel is also desired for 
for all low pressure (I15to9 
Temperature Range - 20 psia)applications, althoug 
copper is used occasionally 
and is acceptable. Alumi­
num is used in applications
Design Considerations/Application Limitations ­ below 20 psia. Metallic
 
materials are chosen so as
 
to prevent galvanic action
Screening Tests ­
and sized structurally to
 
ASME code. (This applies
 
to all items listed above.)
Special Procedures -
Ignition Source Controls -
Failure Experience ­
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GOX MSC Chambers L. 0. Casey 
TYPE OF SYSTEM COMM., MEL., ETC. PRESENTER 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM REVIEW WORK SHEET - Concluded 
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS: List Acceptable Materials by Category or Use/Range 
Class DucLXAxxQX Crew Compartments or suit interiors
 
I. 	 Pressure Range - 0-20 psia (Teflon
 
( Beta
 
7. 	 Temperature Range - 0-lQ&0 F. ( PBI Webbing
 
(Silicon Rubber
 
3. 	 Application Limitation - (Nylon (Limited')
 
(Asbestos

4. Screening Test(s) - Flame impingement and flame propogation 
5. Special Procedure(s) - 100% water spray available on all exposed surfaces 
6. Ignition Source Controls - All wires fused at 1 of rated load, wires Teflon insulated 
and limited to 500 cir-mil/amp hermetical. 
Class I UXX2 High Pressure 
1. 	 Pressure Range - 100 - 2,200 psi ( Teflon
 
( Viton
 
2. Temperature Range - Room temp. 	 ( Nylon (Limited 
3. Application Limitation - Each use is examined 
4. Screening Test(s) - MSC STD 
5. Special Procedure(s) - Routine cleaning 
6. Ignition Source Controls - No electrical interfaces--slow 	 opening valves 
Class lRk=XXJ . Low Pressure 
I. Pressure Range - Below 100.0 
2. Temperature Range - Room temp. 
3. 	 Application Limitation - Each use is examined ( Teflon
 
( Viton
 
4. 	 Screening Test(s) - MSC STE ( Kel-F
 
some neoprene
 
5. Special Procedure(s) - Routine cleaning 
6. Ignition Source Controls - No electrical interfaces 
LIST OF NO-NO'S IN REGARDS TO MATERIALS Iron, oil 
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SIGNATURES DATE 
-21-) 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 
,or 2 2 0 0 si 
_ _ _ _V . 9' 6 r YYnS s r -n 
CODE IDENT NO. 
*219s16 
SIZEA DWG NO. sS-e9M-0004o$ 
MSC Form 1616 A (REV OCT 65) A 
SCALE SHEET /o,/ 
MSC ll-Ft. Chamber Oxygen SystemDocumentation
 
i. STB-SOPM 5.2.2 Cleanliness Spec. For Precision Cleaning
 
2. STB-F-037 -	 ll-ft. Chamber 02 System Checkout Procedure
 
3. 	STB-F-047 - ll-ft. Chamber Suit Engineering 02 and Overpress. Relief
 
System Checkout Procedure
 
4. STB-F-053 -	FMEA 02 Source and Dist. System, Bldg. 7
 
5. STB-F-032 -	FMEA 02 Source and Dist. System, ll-ft. chamber
 
6. STB-SOPM 6.9 - Nonmetallic Material Program for STB
 
7. PMTO - ME-A-450 -	Maintenance task on 02 system
 
8. PMTO - ME-A-440 -	Maintenance task on 02 system
 
9. FMU-5 - ll-ft. Chamber 	02 system pretest checklist
 
10. FMU-6 - ll-ft. Chamber 02 system posttest checklist
 
11i. STB-F-064 - OLECS Operation Manual
 
12. STB-F-058 - FMEA 	- ii ft. chamber OLECS
 
13. 	 STB-SOPM 5.7.1 - Electrical Guidelines and Design Criteria for 02
 
rich environments
 
14. PMU-16 - 11 ft. chamber OLECS pretest and checklist
 
15. PMU-17 - 11-ft. chamber OLECS posttest checklist
 
16. 	 NAS-TO-03-0764-ECII - R&D "Engineering Analysis for Oxygen Compatibility
 
of Materials Use In The PLSS Test Console, 8-ft,
 
Chamber, and 20-ft. Chamber Oxygen Manifold."
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B. CRITERIA AND STANDABDS REVIEW 
by John Conlon and J. H. Kimzey,
 
MSc
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Specifications and Standards
 
A listing of specifications and standards for oxygen has been prepared

and is enclosed as Appendix A. This list includes those that are used
 
by the Manned Spacecraft Center for its own facilities and those pro­
scribed for contractors' use in building spacecraft.
 
It is noted that thousands of specifications exist and the list, there­
fore, is noE intended to be complete. It is however, a listing of the
 
major documents from which other are referenced, except that many con­
tractors such as North American-Rockwell, Grumman, McDonnell-Douglas,

Martin, Boeing, and others have their own in-house documents which are
 
prepared for their procurement and shop use and include, in some cases,
 
proprietary data and techniques.
 
There are many manufacturers and suppliers of spacecraft components.
 
The Beech Aircraft Company, for example, makes cryogenic vessels under
 
contract to North American-Rockwell. They, in turn, buy parts such as
 
motors from the Globe Co. 
No attempt has been made to obtain identifi­
cation of all the specifications involved, much less copies of these
 
documents.
 
Categories of specifications include the raw material, design and 
fab­
rication, cleaning, labeling, assembly, packaging, and environmental
 
test requirements. There are also specifications on assembly areas, such as
 
clean rooms, clothing worn by operators, and test equipment to describe
 
screening procedures to enable a new material to be included, as appro­
priate.
 
Another category of standards specifically excluded from Appendix A is
 
those prepared by organizations; such as, the Society of Automotive En­
gineers, Inc., (for-example, Aerospace Standard "Minimum Standards for
 
Valve High Pressure Oxygen, Cylinder Shut-Off, Manually Operated AS10661),
 
and other professional groups.
 
Despite the many standards and specifications reviewed by this panel, it
 
has become obvious that a void exists in several areas. One area of
 
major concern is the apparent lack of sufficient detail on nonmetallic
 
materials and their application for high pressure oxygen systems to enable
 
a designer to select the proper material for his system.
 
The reason for this is that a comprehensive test program has yet to be
 
defined and accomplished. Although some work has been started in this
 
area, it appears that the required effort is a major one and should
 
begin with developing a standard approach to the problem on the part

of both Government and industry so that all data developed can ultimately

be universally used without the requirements for interpolating test re­
sults from a many faceted approach.
 
The second area of concern is that no standards and/or specifications
 
appear to exist on a total system which points out the hazards resulting
 
P qrn BLA1q1 ITOT FILJ,1 D 
from misapplication of a component which may serve its function well in
 
some applications, but may be trigger mechanism of disaster in another 
application.
 
The NASA attempts to do these kinds of analyses in their required hazards
 
and system safety analysis. This effort undoubtedly has served the NASA
 
well, but these type analyses are not the generally accepted practice 
of industry since we have been unable to find documentation to indicate 
that this practice exists during any of the panels work. 
100
 
S/C and GFE-02 System Related Specifications
 
1. 	MSC-NA-D-68-1(F), Nonmetallic Materials Design Guidelines and Test
 
Data Handbook, 11/26/69
 
2. MSC-SPEC-C-11, 	Precision Cleaning Specification for
 
3. MSC-SPEC-C-6B, 	Apollo S/C Fluid Cleanliness Specification for
 
4. 	MSC-SPEC-C-7, Apollo S/C Fluid Systems Surface Cleanliness, Specification
 
for
 
5. 	MSC-SPEC-C-9, Cleanliness of Non-airborne Breathing Systems, Specifica­
tion for
 
6. MSC-SPEC-C-15, 	Pressure Garment Assembly, Specification for
 
7. 	MSC-SPEC-C-27, Apollo EMO Cleanliness, Specification for
 
Fluid Specifications used for Procurement of 02
 
8. 
MIL-O-27210C, Oxygen, Aviator's Breathing, Liquid + Gas Specification,
 
Specification for
 
9. MSFC-SPEC-399, 	Gaseous and Liquid Oxygen
 
10. MSC-PD-D-67-13, Apollo $pacecraft Nonmetallic Materials Requirements
 
11. 
 Spec No. 4046-1, Pressure Vessel Specification 
- Testing and Cleaning
 
of Pressure Vessels Valves, Fittings, and Piping

June 14, 1966
 
12. MSC-SPEC-C-11A, Precision Cleaning, Specification for
 
13. 
 TTA SPEC 01, 	Cleaning Requirements for Oxygen and Hydrogen Systems,
 
July 6, 1965
 
14. MSFC SPEC 164, 
Amendment 4, Cleanlines of Components For Use In
 
Oxygen Fuel and Pneumatic Systems
 
Contractor Specifications
 
Grumman
 
15. 
GAG LSP-14-O011B, Surface Cleanliness Levels, General Specification for
 
North American
 
16. 
MAO 610-017, Precision Cleaning Methods and Cleanliness Requirements

For Parts and Assemblies of Apollo Fluid Systems
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17. 	 MA 0110-018, Cleaning Components of Propellant, Pressurizing and
 
Circulating Systems 1/17/64
 
18. 	MA 0115-005, -Testing Compatability of Materials For Liquid Oxygen
 
Systems, 2/12/64
 
19. MB0110-011, 	Oxygen, Liquid and Gas, 10/16/64
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MSC FLIGHT SAFETY INFORMATION BULLETIN
 
SUBJECT 

NO.
 
Titanium in Contact with Anhydrous Methanol or
 
Methanol-Freon Mixtures 
 3-1
 
Use of Breathing Oxygen as a Pressure Source 
 6-3
 
Stress Reduction of 4340 Steel Exposed to Ammonium
 
Fluorocoborate 
 18-2
 
Explosion Hazard 
- Metais/Halogenated Hydrocarbons 18-3
 
Use of Nonmetallic Materials in the Presence of Medium to
 
High Pressure Gaseous Oxygen 
 19-2
 
Lubricants Composed of Chloro-Fluorb Chemical Bonds in the
 
Presence of Aluminum and/or Magnesium 
 19-3
 
Corrosion of Aluminum Alloys By Solvent Mixtures of Methanol 
 19-4
 
and Trichlorotrifluoroethane
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MSC DESIGN STANDARDS BULLETIN
 
TITLE NO.
 
Systems Accessibility for Maintenance DS-l
 
Separation of Redundant Paths DS-4
 
Systems Checkout Provisions DS-7
 
Flow Restriction Requirements - Pressurized Sources DS-17
 
Titanium or its Alloys - Prohibited Use With Oxygen DS-26
 
Service Points - Positive Protection From Interchangeability DS-30
 
of Fluid Service Lines
 
Capping of Servicing and Test Ports Which Are Not Required
 
of Flow-Protecttion Against Incorrect Installation
 
Foreign Material
 
Depletion - Ground Support Equipment
 
Vehicle Items Rev. B
 
Joints
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Service Points - Fluid Systems DS-35
 
Fluid Systems - Design for Flushing DS-38
 
Fluid Lines - Separation Provisions DS-42
 
To Function In Flight DS-47
 
Fluid Line Components Whose Function Is Dependent On Direction DS-49
 
ThreadedFittings - Restriction On Release Of Particles and DS-62
 
Metals and Metal Couples - Restriction on Use DS-63
 
Fluid Supplies - Verification Tests DS-71
 
Protection of Pressurized Systems From Damage Due To Pressurant DS-77
 
Cabin Pressure - Venting Restriction DS-78
 
Pressure-Sensor Line Installation PS-1
 
Control of Time - Sensitive Components PS-2
 
Cleanliness of Flowing Fluids and Associated Systems PS-3
 
Procurement Document Identification for Manned Space Flight PS-4,
 
Brazed Joints - Identification Marks PS-7
 
Non-Destructive Testing - Radiographic Inspection of Brazed PS-12
 
Toxicity - Requirements for Nonmetallic Materials Proposed PS-14
 
For Use Within Crew Compartments
 
Flight Hardware and Associated Equipment
 
and Flushing Operations
 
Readiness
 
Leak Detectors - Wetting Agents 

Pressure Relief Valves - Standardization of Functional Test PS-17
 
Protection for Tubing, Fittings; and Fluid System Components- PS-18
 
Fluid System Cleanliness 
- Verification in Draining, Purging, PS-19
 
Fluid Systems - Flushing Requirements PS-22
 
Equipment Failure and Replacement 
- Verification of Flight PS-25
 
PS-36
 
Pressure Vessel Material - Stress Corrosion PS-38,
 
Rev. A
 
PS-39
Pressure Vessels - Qualification Tests 

Fluid Systems -
 Review of Cleaning, Flushing, and Purging PS-42
 
Procedures
 
Purge Gases - Temperature and Humidity Requirements PS-43
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C. Oxygen Specifications Comparison
 
ECPa~sB3LAN NOT FLMJJ0 
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VII. APPENDIX:
 
C. 	Oxygen Specifications Comparison
 
Four specifications used to procure oxygen for various uses
 
were compared to determine the relative requirements. These specifications 
and priority requirements are shown on table II. From this date the 
following observations can be made. 
1. The specification used is procuring oxygen for the (Grade A 
MSC - Spec-C-6B) Apollo command module fuel cells has the most stringent 
purity requirement of the specifications reviewed. This high priority 
requirement is required to insure proper fuel cell operation; however 
compliance with these requirements greatly reduces the hazards associated 
with oxygen contamination. 
2. The grade B oxygen MSC-Spec-C-6B is used in the lunar
 
module or for other non fuel cell uses. It compares very close to the
 
oxygen used for aviator breathing oxygen.
 
3. Specification BB-0-9252 is used for procuring oxygen for
 
industrial uses and does not contain requirement for trace contaminate
 
levels other than an odor test.
 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANIC NOT FILMED
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02 Characteristic 

Purity 

Methane 

Ethane 

Propane 

Alkyne 

Hydrocarbons 

Total 

Hydrocarbons 

Moisture 

Nitros
 
Oxide (N20) 

Halogenated 

Hydrocarbone 

Odor 

Ethylene 

(C2H4)
 
CO and C02 

* MIL-0-27210D 
** MIL-0-272100 
TABLE II - Oxygen Specification Requirements 
S/C Fuel Cell 02 
Grade A 
(MSC-SPEC-C-6B) 
S/C Breathing 02 
Grade B 
(MSC-SPEC-C-6B) 
*AviatorTs Breathing 02 
(MIL-0-27210D) 
Type I (Gas) Type-11 (Liq.) 
**Aviator's 
Breathing 02 
(MIL-0-27210C) 
99.995 percent 
by Vol. Min. 
99.60 percent 
by Vol'Min. 
99.5 percent 
by Vol. Min. 
99.5 percent 
by Vol. Min.*** 
99.5 percent 
by Vol. Min. 
10 ppm 25 ppm 50 ppm 25 ppm 25 ppm 
2 ppm 2 ppm 
1 ppm 
(Higher Hydrocarb
1 ppm 
ons as Propane) 
0.05 ppm 
(As Acetylene) 
14.0 ppm 
(As Methane) 
0.05 ppm 
(As Acetylene) 
29.0 ppm 
(As Methane) 
0.10 ppm 0.05 ppm 
(As Acetylene) (As Acetylene) 
6 ppm for ethane 3 ppm for ethane 
and others and others 
0.05 ppm 
(As Acetylene) 
3 ppm for ethane 
and others 
3.0 ppm 3.0 ppm 0.005 hig H20/liter0.005 mg H20/liter Same as
 (Approx. 7 ppm) (Approx. 7 ppm) Type I and II
 
1.0 ppm 1.0 ppm 	 2.0 ppm 1.0 ppm 1.0 ppm
 
1.0 ppm 1.0 ppm 2.0 ppm As Freons 1.0 ppm as Fresons 1.0 ppm as Freons
 
0.2 ppm as Solvent 0.0 ppm as Solvent 0.1 ppm as Solvent
 
None 	 None. None None Pone 

0.4 ppm 0.2 ppm 0.2 ppm
 
I 	ppm total 5...0 ppm CO' 10 ppm C02 5.0 ppm CO2 5.0 ppm C02
 
5.0 ppm 002 
- dated May 16, 1969 *** As Gas 
- dated June 22,. 1966 As Refrigerants 
Commerical
 
BB-0-925a
 
99.5 	percent
 
by Vol.
 
None
 
D. OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE EmamIENCE SURVEY 
by Meyer Cook, MSC R&QA (GE)
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DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
OxygenBottle Explosion 
Title ,Title ftFire 
McDon el-oulas Airraft Company,Inc., MP1O, 
oue 
171 McD/D Co. 
Source 53M 3265 P27 
J. 0. Weber, C. A. Sell 
Author As4h 
Jarsuay 17, 1956 
Dale D1269 Edilin 
SUMMARY Cede 4(D) () SUMMARY Code4D 
Full causeof explosion and fire not 
detemmed becaus Lo much damage 
was done to leave enough equipment 
to examine. Cause attributed to 
lebarse-glycerol cemenl in the 
cylinder. 
oxygen/lBOO pC 
Gas Conslltuentsfpressre 
Aircraft oxygenbreathing equTpwent 
Equmpmn 
Fireaslatedwhilecrea's 
em s pre c 
nyt stated. gonstt 
, 
oxygen 
. e 
Gas uent 
707 AircaftEquupmeet 
pres 7 'r 
d aimbient 
Property damageNature Ot Darsage/InJuries 
Natureaaure ha~tt 0 Dmg/ries oJf Dfmaue/lnjuo 
Key Words Key Watrds 
oygen ltharge glycerol ceueat materials 
explosion fire popetty damage Oxygen Fire Unknown ongin Property Damage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oygen Supply System Mishaps (Letter) Oxv 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Suoolv Sytem Mishas(Ida) 
Dept. of the Ar Farce 
Source¢. Letter. AFIAS-F3 fet,of theAirFormeSource Ltte,, AFIAS-F3 
Li. Col. Paul A. Bernerd.Au.thor USAF f telAuthor p re Pwe,. iSAF 
A 24. 1970 
Dpate kriiui),Date 1070 
SUMMARY 
Serviceman used improper procedure
which resulted m an explosion wlen 
the oxygen system pressure relief 
was coerpre~msed. 
Code4C 
Oxygen 8B0 PSI 
Gas Uonstituents/Presure 
T33A Arcraft OxnenSystem 
q u p rEent 
SUMMARY 
Explosion in oxygen service cat -
cause not determlind - still under 
itnvemgastlon. 
ode 40 
Oxygen 425 PSI 
Gas Constituents/Pressure 
T37 Aircraft 
Key Words 
oxygen prescore relief pocedure 
51 2 . ] 0lronf~rt s fainclr damage) 
Nattre ot Uaoage/Lnjuries5 
explosion fire property damage 
I 
. Key Words 
Oxygen leek explosion 
.jh rikes toy damaog 
Natir~~lUtg g/gnjuries 
fire injuies p'opey danrage 
---1 - - - - - - -- . 
A LITERATURE SURVEY OF REPORTS
 
OF UNEXPECTED INCIDENTS 
INTHE PRESENCE OF OXYGEN AT
 
CONCENTRATIONS AND PRESSURES
 
'HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE 
NORMAL ATMOSPHERE 
MSC R&QA 
MAY 14, 1970 
Me r 0
 
MSC R&QA (GE)
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I. Summary 
A limited survey has been made of the available literature of unexpected occurrences 
(incidents) involving oxygen at concentrations and pressures higher than that in a 
normal atmosphere of 14.7 pounds per square inch. 
The results of the survey are reported herein, covering 44 separate incidents. 
Twenty-three of the incidents occurred in the presence of 100% oxygen at greater than 
14.7 	PSI pressure. Of these: 
3 were caused by equipment failures 
13 were caused by the presence of noncompatible materials 
1 was caused by failure of personnel to observe procedures and/or precautions 
2 had unknown causes or were still under investigation as of the date of the report 
2 were attributed to accident 
2 were the result of the presence of 100% oxygen without the knowledge of the 
participants. 
About half of the foregoing were attributed to multiple causes. 
A tabulation of the causes of incidents are shown in Table II, and an individual 
summary of each incident is contained in Section V. 
NOTE: Categories above are as used in the original reports. 
XNOT 	 115 
II. Introduction 
The purpose of this survey was to classify and summarize incidents such as fires and 
explosions which occurred in the presence of a combination of 100/6 oxygen and a 
pressure of approximately one atmosphere (14.7 pounds per square inch) or greater. 
The literature available for this survey consisted of documents and reports from the 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center Library, plus additional documents and information 
obtained from several information services. (See Section IV) 
16
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Ill. Discussion 
During the initial screening search of the library and information services listed in 
Section IV, document titles, and summaries where possible, were examined. Inthe search, 
the key words "oxygen," "fire," "explosion," "property damage," "injuries," and the phras. 
"pressure greater than atmospheric" were used as search criteria. This search yielded a 
total of 250 incidents; upon further examination, it was found that only 44 incidents 
occurred at initial pressures greater than one atmosphere in the presence of 100%o oxygen 
or where the heavy oxygen concentration seemed to be the controlling factor. These 44 
incidents have been categorized in Table II, and each incident is further identified and 
described in Section V. 
The 	coding used in Table II is shown in Table I below. 
TABLE I - Explanation of Coding Used in Table II 
Cause of Incident 
A. 	 Equipment Failure 
B. 	 Presence of Flammable Contaminants 
C. 	 Failure of personnel to observe procedures/precautions 
D. 	 Causes unknown (or unresolved - still being investigated as of the date of the 
document or incident report) 
E. 	Accident 
F. 	 Participants did not know oxygen was present 
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TABLE 11 - Tabulation of Causes of Incidents 
Cause of 	Incidents 
Location of Incident orType of Surroundings 	 100°/o Oxygen Oxygen + Inert Gasses Oxygen + Active Fluids 
1. 	 Space Vehicles (including A (1)
 
Ground Support Equipment)
 
2. 	 Missiles (including Ground A (1) A (1) A (1)
Support Equipment) B (1) 
C(1) 
3. 	 Laboratories/Test Chambers 'B (4) A (1) A (1)
 
D (1) F ()
 
4. Aircraft (including Ground B (3) C (3) E (1) 
00 Support Equipment) D (3) E (1) 
E (1) 
5. 	 Medical (Hospitals, B (1)
 
Hyperbaric Chambers, Etc.) F (1)
 
6. 	 Industrial (Welding, Trans- A (6)
portation, 	 Etc.) B (4)
 
C (1)
 
D (2)
 
E (1)
 
F' (2)
 
TOTAL 34* 	 7 3 
* Eleven of the 34 were mixed high/low 	pressure. 
NOTES: 	 See Table II for explanation of categories A, B, etc.
 
Numbers in parentheses show total number of incidents in that category.
 
IV. Sources of Documentation and Reports 
(1) NASA MSC Industrial Safety Office 
(2) NASA MSC R&QA Technical Retrieval Information Service (General Electric) 
(3) U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines 
(4) U. S. Navy 
(5) NASA MSC Technical Library Bibliography Service 
(6) The Boeing Company Technical Bibliography Service 
(7) The Martin Marietta Company (Denver) Bibliography Service 
(8) IDEP (Interagency Data Exchange Program) 
(9) U. S. Air Force 
(10) Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc. 
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V. Summaries of Individual Incidents
 
The following 11 pages are summaries of the 44 incidents 
which form the basis of this report. Four incident summaries 
appear on each page. 
The code classifications used on the summary sheets are 
the same as those used in Table II. 
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DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
SIacecra t Cousaod Module Fire Oten SupplyS'tes Mishaps (Letter)Title Title" 
NFPA 53M 03253 P22 Dept, of the Air Force Letter, AFIAS-F3Soutrce Suc 
NA 
Aulthor LtCal Pail[ A Bereerot. ISAFAto 
1969 Fd,rriDate Arl 24. 1970Date 
SUMMARY Code IA SUMMARY Code2B 
Summary of Apollo SC204 fire. Hydrocarbon contaminnts inside Filter 
Ixygen case adjudgedcause of explosion.16 PSIGas ConsttuentslPressure robably through: 
1. Wiclckg through flange gaskets.
Stocecraft 2. Cotamnatilon of vent plugs doing
menitpinrnt malnWeooVenmce-ui e-t 
LOX supply 
Silo & Missile desboved 
3- Contaminated 
Nate ofdaaenaiarres 
.Three fatalities $03000dmg$10,300,000 damageh"' 
Natire of Dauagelnjure s Nature ot Daoage/nuu Cs 
Key Wards Key Words 
LOX PIopeoty daroge ­
eoxygen spaceraft 16 PSI 3 faalates fire SM-65F 
Missile 
L-15 
Filter 
Noftalltes 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Titan s Silo Accident.. 
.... . 
NFPP 53M Page 21 4315n Spum e Deet. of the Air Force Letter, AFIAS-F3SoSirCe 
thor I. C. Paul A. Beero. USAFAuthorAuthor 
Date PAprillcte, DI 24. 1970pate 
SUMMARY Code2A SUMMARy Code2A 
Lio'quien osh a kosrheret most probable cause of failure was 
support iad costo after laX combilation of faulty welds and mlsdrilled 02F5la spark Ignited coob stitblos - oo dsituents/pressure holes in fuel pastageway plate. Over- GapCOuuituents/Preusare 
sross caused rupture peoing plremature 
mixing of fuel and oxIdizer. 
TitanMissile in a lr. ch Si lo CN-OAMInclEquipmetEquipocrs 
Inloctor assembly 
flln g.- v ins'. $2 026 17eattn oDmnhnge/ulieu
 
Key Words 
 Key Words 
O¢rygnLen P.szeSilo Sparo Tztanimfl~toLe , Weld. FractureLea . Line Spark co.butibjes Mtsdrilled Holes 
Propety lss Injector Plate 
Manufacturing FaultWeld EorhrlUtlroou t 
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DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Final Report of the WS!'F Fire Investigation Board Altitude Simulation 
OxPygen System Mishaps (Letter) SystemSunoly 
 LOX Pep Nube 00 at NSA White Sands Test ?acalsty on
 
Title 
 dleDembe 11, 196 
Dc. of the Air Epice Letter AFIAS -43Souxrce HASAl HSC,- WSW, CodaSCSource 
"IAL "top ensrer. USAF B.C. Ingels. X. B. Ollbreath, X. A. MathisAvtiw Atdh0ar
 
12 Decomber 1968A19O4 
SUMMARY Code2C SUMMARY Code38 
Daviaton firo.Technical order checklist 
allowed the boil-off valve t.oreanclosed fri an extended period of time. LOX 29.5 PSGasConstliuentsiPressore 
Accident attributed to use of 
valves having matersals in-c _paible with pure Oxyjgen atbos- OX 900  pSIG Mo.Coo Constutuents/pnaoswe 
"LOX Groth" occurred, oxygen boil-off 
folloved and fire and explos Ions revulted 
14nM-lA 
EqalpWent 
MIsc[e 
pheree. 
LOX Pnp driven b y 250 S 
Eqorpinen 
Motor 
Natire 
3 . . 0Im-ooedvdarmae 
Danage/|njuries tO Inry Estmanted $17,300.00Niatire noDannv.ge/lvsuries Property dvioge 
Key Words Key Wads 
Oxygen boil-off valve chocklt procedires LOX-grvtdh fire 
LOX 
EBploason 
PBina-Thobbor 
Valve 
Pat=acle 
Mate.. 
Pit 
I ncocoatble 
explosion propety damage Oxygen 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
DeconessinChaoetr Frc ROCketEngine Test Laboratoy FireTitle Title 
ouIORPA M *32 7 P4S rce FPA 53M #3251 P21Sovrce 
196 F9,dhun 1969 EditonDate Date 
SUMMARY Code 3A SUMMARY Code3A 
Portable CO scrubber singie-phased, LOX line boke duin test oi a heat
overheating Fine cad, causing ignition. O svoeem rosen 40HPtcttun/p  ",xhaw~u Not surfaces ignited oxygenn - LOC as 
Fuelmixtire Gas ConsttuetsfPessire 
Decoerm.sion haster
Equipment LabratoryEquipnent 
2 saitle s. 2 imurles.520.000 ropvety damaig 65 r5roetydav a e 
Natureof Dainago/l urtnnvic tDasesIsee 
Key Words KeyWads 
Oxygen helium nitrogen decompression chamber scrubber single-phase oxygen LOX line rupture break fuel heat fire property damage 
aot.r overheated line cord fIre 2 deaths 2 injuies propety darsa.e 
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DOCUMENT-SUMMARY 	 DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
F=re,ntovaen nrne lne Static Invesrter Plusiability Teat 
Tile TiLle 
N]PA 53M #41 p91 	 North American Rockwell Corp., Report#AT R 142007Sotlrce 	 uc 
NA 	 Several 
AatIfo 	 Author 
DZ__n ___ __ 	 7 July 1967 Date 
SUMMARY Code 3B 	 SUMMARY Code 3D 
Contamlnating by halogenatedhy ro­
cabon cused explion in high Pressre Oen 2200 PSI This was a test under controlled 0xygen l6.5PSIA
 
pipeline. GeasCenst.nt/Pressurc condit-ons. No goolu.ons can Uas £OfStItU~iitS/PeC5u51
 
be drawn from the test results 
other than that the re-design of 
Laboratory Systems the equipment was ncesfary. Static Inverter in Test Chamber 
Equipsen- Equipment 
$215 000 ro cit dama e Not assennabie 
Nature Natere o Damage/injuries 
KeyWends 	 Key Words 
Oxygen Test Charber
 
Oxygen Pipe line hydrocarbon contamination ,esplonon propery damage Igniter Ign.i n Pire
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 	 DOCUMENT'SUMMARY 
Accident Report on ECS Module C-59, ui ding 32, January 14. 1966 	 Final Report of the WSW inre Investiation nBerd Altitude 
Sioulation System LOXpmp Number Three at NASA PSC White Sands 
Trle 	 Title Test Facility on September 16, 1966 
eSA/4SC Safety Office 03 NASA/ MC, WSW. Cone SC
 
Soee Sorce
 
a. IH.Chappee. J. B. Powell, H. G. Sionsons .J. Pitts- S_ X. Burke, R J Sturt
 
Autho Authnr
 
21 June, 1966 	 15 October 1966 
Date 	 Date 
SUMMARY Code3B 	 SUMMARY Code 3(A) 
Accmdent we attributed to either Ceese of accident not definite 
the cummulative build-up of contaminatio OXygen 2S0PSr Ma determined. Attributed to one L0C $00 to 600 PSI 
on the valve seat or the sudden entrap- Gas Constltuents/Pemsumo t the three folloingcruses in Gas Consttueets/Pessu 
set of c contamgrnnt between the ball order of probability. 
and seat of 1aive.ither case, . Chip of piece of impeller flew offthe En 
the accident investigation resulted in ECS Module High Pressure System and wa ground between housin and LOX Pump driven by 250 uP Motor 
the replacement of DELEIN as valvese. Equipment impeller creating heat and sparks. Equipoent 
with EFON and the redesxign of the 
systsm to prevent the possibility of - Inboard Thrust seatingfailure 
operating the valves at high pressures. 
Procedures were also re-writtenj ." A foreign particle of unknown 
composition entering into the 
econd and Third Degree urns pump. NOInuriee. Dollar value of dama 
SNatere otVantage/Injeri O property Daae Nauru of Damage/njuries not stated 
not mentioned 
Key Words ; 	 Key Wnds 
oxygen DELIRS TEFLON Contaminant lOX Pp Particle Fire 
Valve Seat Fare Explosion Chip Metal Searing Failure 
Injuriesj aterxal Incompatible 
123 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
RepOrt of Invetia on.- Daagg to Pule X-Ry Eqgncaant 

Title JUlY 24, 1969 Bukildizg 31 

NASA/ASC Industrial Safety Office, Code SC 

Source 

A_ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_t.Autho 
6 October t 1969 pate 
SUMMARY Code3F 
ThcPlsin caused by capacitor

discharge 
 in pure Oxygen 718- 99% Oxygen 2015 s pinterl flask
laoeled "cowpressed Al., 79% Ga. terbstituenls/Freasre 240 psi workig 
Nitrogen, 215 Oxygen" 
obotron Pulsedflectnn-Oem S-Py
Equpet System 
No linjurY" Lea than510000.00 

Natose OtOarage/lrnjune Property damage. 

Key Wonds 
Oxygen Nxplosaon 240 PSI tts-labeJ2015 PSI Flask Capacitor Discharge 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Ad Frl e 
NFPAur 53M *32602 P266ent. 
boone 
A 
Autho 
1969 Edition 
UMtR 

SUMMARY COdeS E) 

Shot circ t Tanltedufe looking froe
line. Fire caused aluinum iting to en Pressure Bottle 

rit firomoxygen controlpanel, releasing as onst. ts.ent-
0o 
Al tliment 
t 177 0O0 .prpety damage$] 
Natureeofaylge7Isnjres . 
KeyWonds 
oxygen short circuit fie diagefel property 
U432
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oxygen Supply System Mishaps (Letter) 
TItle 
Dept. oFthe Air Foote Letter, AFFAS-SSSource 
Cot. PaulA. Bersgt. USAFAuthOr 
AnvIl24. 1970Date 
SUMMAARY Code41(D) 
Grease o oil con.taoation suspected
 
as cause of explosion and fire evidence us e 
 2 PSIdestroyed i ocldeo. as onstttett/Paessuo 
T-33 Aircraft 
Equipment 
]F~gaitv Pso~tvdamage 
NatsEyamabeAfnurte 
Key Words 
Oxyge. cootaslnation explosion fire ftalhty poperty daae 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Ttvoen Suonolv Mishaps (Letter)Syste 
of the Air Foe Letter. AFASF-
Sorce 
Lt.Col.ParA. Brerort. [UOAF 
Annii 4lo
 
Date
 
SUMMARY Code36 (C) 
Combination
of­(a) Certastitn byhydeocaos O4 ) Ovefttquing oconnecIons oositrents/PAress're

c) improperservicing procexres
 
gener ting excessive beatcaused fleeand explosion during serVici T33A Arcraft Gaseaus cvaen system
.f aircaft cxygen system Eqiipsaet 
.raertvdarnee 
Ratiut 0' Oai5ag/ltj tries 
Key Wad is 
oxygen conta ination hydrocarbon procai es everton9
 
fittings fire explosion p'operty damage
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Aircraft Fire 
Title 
NFPA 53M #3261 P26 
Soree 
NA 
Author 
4 69 EditionDate 
SUMMARY Cde 4D 
During inspection, opening of valve 
triggered fire. Unknown cause - possible Oxygen, Pressure Bettle 
impsirity or temperature rise caused by Gas onotrtrent/Preasuro 
adiabatic pressure of pure oxygen, 
Aircraft 
quppment 
Na o Mg riesxa 
KeyWords 
oxygen adibatIlc ressure impurity Fire property damage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oxygen Batle Explosion
Title 
McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Company,Inc. MP 11,477 McD/D Co 
Sourc. 
R. P. Colbun, J. R. Holling r 
AuWhoR 
8/26/59 
Date 
SUMMARY Code4E 
Loose Nylon polpet moving under 

1800 psi pressure r heat generated OxygeiVISO psi 

bycompression, ignited thepoppet In GasConsttuents/pr e 

the valve, causing rm and explosion 

DC-S Aircraft oxygen supply bcotle 
E-quIpment 
Personnel booty, bottle destroyed 
N,. g 
Key Words 
oxygen valve explosion fire Injury 

aircraft
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Aircraft Explosion 
Title 
NFPA 53M #3321 P3O 
Sounce 
NA 
Author 
1 69 EditionDate 
SUMMARY Code4F
 
Oxygen cylIndor mistakenly used to
 
"Inert" Fuel manifold lines in an Oxunen Nish
 
aircraft instead of nitrogen. Explosion GasConttituents/Pessire
 
killed 3 men and damaged aircraft
 
Aircraft Fuel System 
ontte~iPir 
Mitre ofanae/nuries 
KeyWords 
Oxygen fuel muanifold nitrogen explosion 3 fatalities popeity damagi 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Airr FireTitle 
43262 P26SNFPA 53MSource 
NA 
Auth 
1.969 EdituoeDate 
SUMMARY Cde 4 E 
Spark ignited ffata es being used 
Sprk ne firl eged 
to eoe lnleum. Fire caused oxygen Osjrenen olets 
relIef valves to vent, intensifying flames Gas unsttuenta/Presnre 
Equipmenrt 
Natureova ae/rajuries 
Key Words 
Oxygen spark flammables valves fire property damage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
t Prossure Regulator Valve FireTitle 
&PAS3M #3216 10Source 	 'Scouce" 
NA 
ale ition 
SUMMARY Cde Si 
During transfer of the pressure

regulator valve from one oxygen oxygen Cylinder presaure
+

supply bottle to anther, the Gas CGstheleetsPressr 
valve components ignited.
 
Accident attributed to nn-cospat Incubater Oxygen Tent 

ible material in.. regulator. uipineuit 

Infant fatalitv 5 icernon ,inuredNature ol Dareq~auunes 
Key Words 
COcygen Regulator Fatality 1.3uriegaterial eLanto Fatui s 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
To0eratine oo Excloeson 
]gll 	 PgTitle 
Pag 27.NFPA 
lAuthor 

1969Edition 
135te 

SUMMARY Code5F (E) 
Series of events in anuoperatinag 
room resulted in explosion & tire 
which destroyed room and caused ennOxC ole ro ar Et'.
several dea y less.Aent ORtunt- m-,---"rts injurie 
anare popey los deepolo. 
attributed to:
A. Cyolopropane bottle p.artiall aratlne Rons Asaeethents equpt.
loaded with Oxyen. Pquiptm 
5. 	200-rapid openi of valve
 
on bottle. doet of friotlo,

ignited mixed ga.(Frobhbly woUd not have
 
occurred had bottle contal d

only eyoloprope) Auet..x rnUtatOie.sever taunt 
. prossteorteI
p -ty los. 

Key Wesrs 
XYSC0 yOplOp Valve E'her 
Fire Explosi0n Pragentatlon
Nitrous Oxide 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oves Cllnder FireTitle 
MFPA 53M *322#3 P20 
Edit ea 
SUMMARY Code6A 
Fire attrlbuted to failure of a valve 
on an acetylene cyinder. Heatfused Oxygen Highvales on oygen and acetylene cylinder. CiaetfUrsttuentssigh 
Welding
Equipment 
Six Deaths $1,123 .000 roperty damageNatine OfOanugeJlnjurues 
Key Wais 
oxygen acetylene valve failure fire propeuty damage fatriles (6) 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Pessure Gage Explosion 
Nee 53M 3224 P20 
A&to 
Dteq f,
 
SUMMARY Code6A 
Pressure gage fom a hydraulicsystem
Installed on oxygen system caused i 
astent es 
_ _ _ __ _ _ 
Nat-s oreamageinnores 
Key Words 
xygen gage hydraulicsystem explosion personnelInjuries 
qU6
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Orygen Transfer Pump Exploagen Transfer pump txploson 
TitleTtl 
NoPA Sm 3202 Page17Sorce 
Author 
1969 Editton 
Date 
SUMMARY Code 6A (B) 
Nitrogen Seal in crosshoad seotlol 
of transfer pup failed, permatta 1 Oioaen 1000 PSI 
contamination of oxygen with lube (as Const'toets/press Se 
oil. Deat of compression evdenrt 
iy causedignton and explosion.
 iec'orocatnp Oxyoen Transfer pep
Equpacet 
0000 no oertc-s Deonate 
Natre so f*aisgeliojuries "a' 
Key Words 
oxygen PiUp Nitrzogen Sealoxgn e~pNts.. eloen 
Trarsfer Failure Explosion 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Compressor 
Tile 
NPA 5N 3207 Page17Source 
NANA 
Author 
1969 EdirinDale 
SUMMARY Code6A() 
Worn TFLON rider rings on a 
compress or piston roe) permitted 
lubr.catog ol. to escape into an 
Orygen- cylinder where xt 
spont.neous Wnsted. 
Oxy-gen lint 
Gas 
Comressor 
-qospenr 
Spe 
aois
ied 
tueras/
(High 
Prssero 
125. 000. O P amaaepreeryNature 00 liamage~anjumea . 
Key Words 
Oxygen High Pressure TEFLON t Rider rings 
Lubricating oil Piston Ex.plOS.On Fire 
0. uen/Aretvene Pinion System Exnlmson/__r 
NFPA 53M #3220 P19Source 
Or
 
Edun,, 
SUMMARY Code6A 
Electric are ruptured on acetylene pipe line 
and ignited gas. Explosion ruptured .20,. PSI
 
oxygen line.
 
Woidiro Folllneot (Shryo) 
Euiipmeot 
$76000Orropect damage 
te of Dmage/nr ,,eo' 
Key Words 
59n PoeydseProperty damage
ercplos-o 
aceLylene 
pip-ng
r~e 
electric arc 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
LOX Deliverv Truc Tang<Rigirore 
Tile 
NFPA 53M oI p6p150tirce 
Athor
 
1Q69 Harr.Dale 
SUMMARY Code6A 
Tank ruptured duringdehmeey. Oxygen 
reached noncompaible materiol resulting LOX 
in ignition. fgs Constituents/Presslme 
DelVery TrucktqiinenL 
S.000.000 or0serte damageNatire o0psaiae/tinoorCs 
Key Words 
LOX -Tank- Rupture Material Noncompatible property damage 
b27
 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
*ire *n Oxygen Cylinder Stora e Area
'Tile 
NFPA 53M #3215 P13 
Source 
PA 
Author 
1969 Edition 
Date 
SUMMARY Code 6A 
Fire in storage shed caued cx-

plosion of Oxygen Cylinders. Oxygen. 2250 PSI (Cylnders) 

Considerable property damage GasCostttuents/Pvessure 
OCyrsen Cyli.nderx in Storage Area 
emp'en 
proert Damge - unspeified
Natiure age/liures 
Key Words 
oxygen PIre Eplosion Storage
Cylinders 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
3,800 gui. esuscity LOX Truck 
TitleTnl
 
NFPA 53M 43200 Pi6PA 
Date 
SUMMARY CodIeAA(FH) 
Leak in transfer hose released exygen.Staic sprk (or othe2 ignited grease LOX 
ortires. Heat caused LOX taik to Gas onstatuents/pressure 
rupture, 
LOX delivery truck 
ourefDaaeg nug e 
Key Word 
hose lesk static sulk tLank rupture LOX popeity loss 
128 
High Pressuge Oxygen Pump EquipmentExplosion & FireTidle 
NFPA 53M #203 P17 
bourse 
N 
Anther 
1969 EditionDate 
SUMMARY Code6B 
Glycerine -ther flatuable material
 
residue In btoe, of filte ignited during Oygen High
 
operation. Gastoessttuents/PreSSLre 
Pus/Filtriqlnts 
Prorya oeHatre elflarnage/njotiesi 
Key Words 
Oxygen pump filter 91Yulne ,oncmpautlble radterial residue 
ignition sroperty dareage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Ti l Pte-- of ishigh ressia Me valee n 
53 rage 21 *3240 
)e
 
SUMMARY Cde 6A IF)
Accident attributed to either 
Rapture of a high pxessure valve, VSyv, O's-..e (ES) 
or Gas /assureacoestituents; 
Short circuit of 300 V15 cable to 
oxygen pi , resulting in ito ign 
uatre-ot1Aagage/njsrieg " loam.e : 
KeyWads 
Oxygen High Pressure Valve nigh Voltage 
, Ruptureire roprto ytoss 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oeyoen Comweess Fire 
TItle 
NFPA 53M #3204 P17 
rSor e 
NA 
Author 
1969 Edition 
Date 
SUMMARY Code68(D) 
Fire attributed to metal "feathers" or
 
'fingers" left in compressor cylinder, or OxygFre

oil seepage into cylinder or rapture of GaosCi tuentg/press.r 

cyliunder wall. Damagewas so extenive,t
 
exact cause not determined. 
Compressor

Equiprnent 
Property damage$375,000 
Nature of Damage/Irunes 
Key Words 
oxygen finges property damage compressure cylinder metal 
rupture Feathers fire 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
OIwoen Distillation Clum, Exofesion 

Tle 

NFPA 53M #3206 P17 

Source 

',k~O 
iqA. Pdh,, 
Date 
FleLocaton od Accession Number 
SUMMARY Code6B 
Hydrocarbon build-up in the refractor 

column bel'eved to hNuecaused naveen 

explosion. Gas onAstuantS/Presscare 

Refradr Column 
EqeLipanent 
$830,000 prerty damage
Nature eoUarnage./inrues 
Key Words 
oxygen Fydrocerbon explosuoa propertydamage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Oxygen Cylinder Fire 
Title 
NFPA 53M #3223 P20 
Source 
NA 
Author 
0 69 Edition 
taste 
SUMMARY Code6C QG) 
started in oiy rags ignitedby.
tank. G N Oxygen High-
Welding
Equipment 
N35,000 popeny damage 
TNaturea Dmageguisuraee, 
Key Words 
oxygen raps oil cpaks grder Woperty damage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Distillation Column Explosion 
Title 
NFPA 53M 43205 P17 
Source 
NAAuthor 
1969 Edition 
Date 
SUMMARY Code 6B (D) 
Fereig matter (udetermined) In
 
distlllaton column exploded. Oxygen
Gas eosttuonts/Pressure 
Dlstilloen Column 
equipment 
I400,.00 opeJty damame 
Natire ml Dsoge/Injuries 
Key Words 
oxygen foreignmatter explosion prguerty damage 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Tiou 'reoninicrt Fl! 
NFPA 53M #3332 P30Source 
1969 FditinnDa te 
SUMMARY Code D (G) 
Fire oFuidnown orgin aggravated by 
use of oxygen to bloWout ship's suction Qsvnsti ­
lines instead of cornn-essed air. Gas tonsttunt/Rrss 
Shin's soiinsrenEqu~pmscnt 
f,
Ngue 01Dsage/Iljriesl 
KeyWords 
Oxygen compressed air blowing fire 5 fatalites 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
l.n
Fre Ethylene-Oywes Reactor feed. 
Title 
NPA 53M Page 20 #3230 
Source 
Auth.r 

1969 R tion 
Date 
GE- n Cnr*ie Locaton and Acesslonl Number 
SUMMARY Code60 
Uneoplained esplosoon following r 
adjastxunt by oerators at the 
Oxygen Plant. O ete, $ W'*oei.C tief 
Cenve-"'Equipmnt 
San enn nnOr ee-.. ' r and 
o~Ntureaage)iij'rnesflnc,= cIon i-nter 
Key Words option 
Oxygen Compe.sor. Exploieo. Fire 
Indetra l Accident losses Ethylene 
Detnaton 
Oe? Engine Starter Exloslon 
NFPA 53M £3330 P30Sour.ce 
'OAE thin.Date 
SUMMARY Code 6F
 
Oxygen used instead of compsessod
air 
to start a diesel engine resulted in 
explosion and fire. GasCenstltuents/PlessoSe 
Diesel EngineIquipr/eent 
Onefatality -omrty damge 
, Nste of Oarsne/]nsurses 
Key Werds 
Oxygen diesel starter explosion ftatlity propeatydiage fire 
DOCUMENT SUMMARY 
Atccdent an Oxvgen/uaxonia Plant 
Tite 
NFPA 53 M Page 20 3231
 
Source
 
Author
 
'99 EdZtn 
Date 
SUMMARY Code6E(A) 
Electrical Failure opened reduemn 
valvae. Coipre,. i dlirg to 
mainain pressure agains st- yoxnen Pressureunsecfxed 
off valve, perxted hot oi to ostceents/Prsm 
enter Oxygen lne afer 3 hours. 
Case of o "fai lsafe" design. ConessraEquipment 
5405 000 00nropertv danuce 
Izoatre ofDasusgefl ninen 
Key Words 
Oygen Nitrogen, Coepressors Valve 
i lectracal Failure 0i Cntrnuetlon 
130
 
APOLLO 131INVESTIGATION TEAM
 
SPECIAL FINAL ORT DISTRIBUTION LIST 
I/ 
AA/R. R. Gilruth 
PA/J. A. McDivitt 
PA/O. G. Morris (Chairm , Panel 5b)
 
PA/R. S. Johnston (Chai man, Panel 5c, 8)
 
PA/S. H. Simpkinson
 
PA/R. W. Kubicki
 
PA/E. B. Hamblett
 
PT/D. D. Arabian (11) ( airman, Panel 1)
 
CB/J. A. Lovell (Chairma , Panel 2)
 
FA/S. A. Sjoberg (Chairm n, Panel 3)
 
BL/J. R. Brinkmann (Chai man, Panel 4)
 
PF/A. Cohen (Chairman, Pa el 5a)
 
PD/C. H. Perrine, Jr. (Oh irman, Pa 1 6)

ES/Dr. W. R. Downs (Chair n, Pane 7)
 
AP/Brian Duff (Chairman, P nel 10
 
PP/J. G. McClintock (Cha n, P el ll)
 
NA/M. L. Raines (Chairman, ane 9)
 
E. P. Swieda, Apollo 13 Re ew oard (2) 
PP/C. King 
E. M. Cortright 
Mark
Dr.r. H. M.. lark 
V. L. Johnson 
R. F. Allnutt
 
N. Armstrong 
Brig. Gen. W. R. Hedri 
M. Klein
 
C. W. Mathews
 
G. Malley 
R. G. Romatowski
 
E. Kilgore
 
F. .Smith 
H. Schurmeier 
S. Himmel
 
DISTRIBUTION SHOULD BE MADE BY NlUMBERED COPIES.
 
LIST SHOULD BE KEPT DESIGNATING WHAT COPY EACH RECEIVED.
 
131
 
NASA- MSC - Coml., Houston, Texas 
